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WHY THE PING-PONG?

China's Plans: An Informed Guess

O. Edmund Clubb

•

Addiction, the Counter-Culture

Mac Proctor

•

CONVERSION TO PEACE

Reorganizing the Lines of Power

Derek Shearer

Defense: Maybe Too Much Is Enough

Richard F. Kaufman

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EDITORIALS

Those Mass Arrests

The demonstrations of the Mayday Tribe were ill-advised. By comparison with the April 24th demonstrations and the deeply impressive observances of the anniversary of the killings at Kent State, the tactics of the Tribe can be easily deplored. All the same, one cannot help feeling sympathy for the young people who tried—and to a degree succeeded—in raising hell in Washington. They saw no end to the war and were convinced that nothing but disruptive tactics would get attention. They felt goaded past the point of endurance. Most experienced political leadership might have offered them more sensible tactics and a better plan of action, but no party or movement that now exists could command their confidence.

More important, the failure of the Tribe was far exceeded by the failure once again of the Administration to provide leadership in an emergency. Orders for the mass arrests came directly from the President to the Justice Department and to the police; the administration for the District was bypassed. Arrests on this scale—11,000 or more—cannot be made without wholesale violations of constitutional safeguards and procedures. That most of those arrested have been or will be released is beside the point; a dangerous precedent has been established. On another tomorrow, the numbers arrested may be even larger, their detention longer. Government is not without remedies in dealing with large mass rallies. Police can cordon off streets and buildings. Token arrests can be made after orders to disperse. The leaders and organizers of unlawful assemblies can be charged with various offenses. What the Administration did, as the ACLU correctly points out, was to sacrifice law in the "interest of order"—that is, its conception of order. Actually, the dragnet arrests were a breakthrough in the direction of the disorder that is implicit in lawlessness.

As a postscript, *The Nation* offers its congratulations to Sen. Lee Metcalf who took a punch at a policeman who attempted to deny him access to the Capitol. The Senator may be "invisible"—see last week's *Nation*—but he has a good right arm, and the determination to discharge his duties as a Senator.

The Ultimate Question

The Supreme Court's 6-to-3 decision—dissents by Brennan, Douglas and Marshall—on two aspects of the death penalty is deeply disturbing. First of all, Justice Harlan's view that the awesome responsibility which jurors face in such cases is assurance enough that they will act responsibly and can therefore be entrusted to exercise an "untrammeled discretion," flies in the face of reason and experience. Cases in which the death penalty can be imposed are cases which arouse fears, hatred, ethnic animosities and social prejudices. Of the 648 cases now pending, it is estimated that from 55 per cent to 60 per cent of the condemned men are Negroes. The Court also denied the companion argument that guidelines should be given to juries in a separate hearing at which the character of the sentence would be determined. But the Court itself has held that it is inappropriate to invoke the death penalty in a rape case which did not involve significant physical injury. No doubt guidelines would be difficult to formulate and apply, but a strong case can be made for them. What the Court has done is to sidestep once again "the ultimate question," which is whether the death penalty constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment. If it had faced that issue squarely four years ago, the chances of a favorable ruling would have been better than they are today, first because Warren and Fortas were then on the Court, and second, because the change of Administration has to some extent brought about changes in public opinion.

The public is now being assured that there will be no sudden rash of executions in the 648 pending cases. But it is cold comfort to be told that not all of the condemned will be promptly trotted off to the gas chamber or gallows. Four executions have already been scheduled between June and August, and as many as ten a month will be scheduled in the near future. Some of the condemned will be saved by the doctrine of the *Witherspoon* case, which fortunately is retroactive, but the lower courts have cut that doctrine to ribbons through a process of interpretation. (In effect, the case held that a prospective juror who expressed a general scruple about the death penalty could not be peremptorily challenged, but that a person who categorically rejected it could be excluded. Whether a person falls in one category or the other has opened up a fine field for hairsplitting interpretations.) The main hope is that the Supreme Court will finally decide that the death penalty constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment. The California Supreme Court narrowly rejected this argument in a 4-to-3 decision, which is some indication that it has real weight and substance.

Meanwhile, groups and individuals who abhor the penalty will have to bestir themselves. Governors should be urged to commute sentences. Former Gov. Winthrop Rockefeller, who did not want to play the role of God, commuted all death sentences before leaving office. Governor Gilligan has said that no death sentences will be carried out in Ohio until the Supreme Court decides "the ultimate question." On May 15 the NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational Fund will sponsor a conference at Columbia University to work out a nationwide strategy on the handling of pending appeals, petitions for clemency and commutation, and requests for legislative action. The death penalty is a barbarous relic. It will be abolished—in time. It has been held in abeyance for the last four years, so every execution from now until it is abolished is not only cruel but futile.

A concerted effort, however, is needed to move the nation from *de facto* to *de jure* abolition. The point about the death penalty is that it is imposed so sparingly—say thirty cases a year before the recent moratorium—and against such abject, unknown, friendless, poor, rejected specimens of the human race that it has not placed much burden on the national conscience. But the character of the condemned constitutes one of the best arguments for abolition. The rich are never executed. A middle-class person is seldom executed. More blacks are executed than whites. More men than women (of the 648 pending cases,

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only seven involve women). It is, in brief, a penalty where application is discriminatory, even if one makes allowances for such considerations as that more men commit capital offenses than do women. A grave responsibility now rests on the media to induce the public to see and face these and other realities. The retreat and capitulation reflected in the decisions—for example, Justice Blackmun, who had told a Senate committee that he opposes capital punishment, joined in the majority decision—can be reversed, if a strong, concerted nationwide effort is mounted.

Gauntlet for the Poor

Justice Harry Blackmun finally cast a vote for "the little people" he claimed to prize when the Senate was considering his nomination, but it was not enough to avert the regressive 5-to-3 Supreme Court decision that approves subjecting low-income housing projects to a voters' gauntlet.

Referendums may, as Hugo Black avers, represent devotion to democracy, but when they give the people in a community the opportunity to veto public housing for the poor they may serve to make the suburbs whiter than white. Blessed by the ruling was a 1950 amendment to the California constitution that conditions the construction of low-income housing in a town or city on the approval of the voters. Ten other states have similar procedures. Nowhere must middle-income housing meet that sort of test.

Black, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and three colleagues dismissed the argument advanced by an unusual coalition including the Justice Department, the AFL-CIO, the NAACP, and segments of the construction industry that Article 34 is unconstitutional because it singles out the poor and puts a special burden on them.

In effect, the Court concluded that laws that disadvantage a racial minority violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, but laws that disadvantage the poor do not. The anguished dissenters, Thurgood Marshall, William J. Brennan, Jr., and Blackmun, found this reasoning passé, wrong, and trampling on the values the amendment was designed to protect.

California would seem to provide a fair example of the effectiveness of these voter vetoes. For twenty years, from 1950 through 1969, 48 per cent of the public-housing units approved by local officials were subsequently defeated at the ballot. And yet the state, with 8 per cent of the nation's poor, has ony 4 per cent of the low-income housing units.

Atty. Gen. Louis Lefkowitz of New York, voicing his state's opposition to the California scheme, cautioned the Court during its deliberations that "if California can require the exceptional burden of a referendum before seeking assistance to house the poor, opponents of public housing in other states may be encouraged to create the same obstacle to the future development of low-income housing."

The ruling could well blunt the unanimous declaration of the Court, only one week earlier, that Southern school districts should use massive bussing and all other available tools to eliminate *de jure* segregation, but did not

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move on the matter of *de facto* segregation. White city dwellers eager to escape from strict integration presumably can now move to the suburbs with the expectation that the poor and the black, who generally are one and the same, can be screened out.

President Nixon has publicly rationalized this opposition to "forced integration" on economic rather than racial grounds. He said in a televised interview last month that he would not authorize "a low-cost federal government project" in an area of middle-class homes "unless it is required by the law."

This position signals a less than avid use of federal power to break through suburban barriers. The Court's ruling offers a legal technique that could quicken the separation of metropolitan areas into black central cities and white suburbs. As for housing officials, they now must not only obtain homes for the poor but also find a community willing to put up with poor neighbors.

Death of a Soldier

He was a first lieutenant and he was killed just four weeks before the end of his tour of duty. He had graduated from West Point near the top of his class, served on the honor committee, completed a course in Ranger training, and volunteered for Southeast Asia. He did not think that anyone should be forced to enter our armed services.

There is nothing extraordinary about a lieutenant—or a soldier of any rank—being killed in Indochina; it has happened to 45,000 of our men so far and the total is still rising. But this lieutenant was not killed in combat. He was not a helicopter casualty or the victim of an accident—there are many accidental deaths in every war. He was the target of a "fragging," as he lay sleeping in his billet at Bien Hoa.

"Fragging" is a delicate subject in the Army and heretofore the Pentagon has been reluctant to discuss it. A commissioned officer or a noncom is "fragged" when an enlisted man uses a fragmentation grenade with intent to kill or wound someone of higher rank. These grenades are of potato size and easily concealed.

Sometimes the assailant has a specific target, but that does not seem to have been so in this recent fragging incident, which was discussed in the Senate on April 20 by Sen. Lee Metcalf and the Majority Leader, Senator Mansfield. The victim came from Montana, hence the special interest of Messrs. Mansfield and Metcalf. By all indications, the lieutenant was popular; the fragger may not even have known him. He may just have wanted to kill an officer, as a way to vent his rage. There are thousands of bomb explosions in the United States every year, the great majority having nothing to do with politics. Fragging is the service equivalent, and it is confined almost entirely to the Army because that service is most plagued by indiscipline, often verging on mutiny.

According to the Pentagon, 209 fragging incidents were reported in 1970, more than double the number for 1969. The number of deaths decreased, however, from thirty-nine to thirty-four, presumably because the attacks were more indiscriminate. The Pentagon has not released figures on the numbers of wounded, nor on the apprehension and conviction of fraggers.

The basic causes of the fragging phenomenon, practically unknown in previous American wars, are probably the unpopularity of the war, the widespread use of drugs, and the generally rebellious attitude of many young civilians toward forced military service.

It should be noted that the revulsion against the Indochinese war is not confined to enlisted men. The Concerned Officers' Movement is gaining momentum. It is, however, an orderly, organized protest. The officers have that outlet; the enraged Pfc. tosses a grenade.

The subject is now out in the open, and it should remain there. Senator Mathias pointed out that the discussion by Senators Mansfield and Metcalf marked the first time that fragging had surfaced in the Senate. The facts of this war are hideous—the more reason to face them.

Playing Games With Hunger

In "The Reality of American Hunger" (*The Nation*, April 26) Sen. Ernest F. Hollings referred to a National Nutrition Survey, mandated by Congress in December 1967. The survey covered more than 70,000 Americans, most of them poor; it cost $5 million. The Nixon Administration has disposed of the report on this survey in a way that oversteps the line that separates ordinary political gamesmanship from the manifestly outrageous.

The report was prepared for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare by Dr. Arnold E. Schaefer, a world-renowned expert on malnutrition, who was also director of the survey.

On March 23, Senator Hollings introduced a sense-of-the-Congress resolution calling on HEW to release the report; the survey, he said, had been completed a year earlier. On or about March 23 Mr. Hollings inserted part of the survey data in the *Congressional Record*, and summarized a portion of it for *The Nation*. These actions put the heat on HEW, and on April 30 the report was released, but doctored so as to make the situation look less deplorable than it is. Dr. Schaefer's name appears nowhere in the report.

Senator McGovern has also criticized the Administration's handling of the report. At a hearing of his Select Committee on Hunger and Human Needs, he complained that the report was long overdue and that he had not been given a chance to read and criticize it before publication. He said that the handling of the survey and the report was "typical of the shabby treatment of Dr. Schaefer."

The downgrading of the National Nutrition Survey is not the only case of its kind. The Children's Foundation, a highly respected source, has issued material indicating that the Administration has also doctored the facts about the need for school lunches, the number of children receiving free lunches, etc. Actually, far more children stand in need of free lunches than Mr. Nixon's henchmen are willing to admit.

While the Nixon team plays politics with hunger, it cannot be said that it is totally hardhearted. It is sponsoring special legislation to provide $250 million in U.S.-backed loans for the financially distressed Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. If hungry Americans could impersonate large, ailing corporations, they could rely on more nearly adequate nourishment.

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The Merit of Ulbricht

Walter Ulbricht's resignation as First Secretary of East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity Party marks the end of an era and a generation. It has raised questions throughout the Communist world that can be fully answered only after the East German party congress (June 14-19), which Leonid Brezhnev and other leaders of the Soviet bloc are expected to attend.

Having known Lenin and worked with and under Stalin, Ulbricht is Eastern Europe's only prominent survivor of communism's heroic era. A militant for sixty years, he thinks of himself as a soldier of the world Communist movement. Being thus a soldier and a German, obedience to the party, as directed by Moscow, has become his second nature. In his early years in German and world politics, Ulbricht was thoroughly underrated. Like Stalin, he has been called a narrow bureaucratic dictator and a mediocrity. Actually, Walter Ulbricht is a man of great organizational talent, quick intelligence and subtle perception. It has been said of him that "he hears the grass grow." Unlike Stalin, Ulbricht is outgoing, jocular and sensitive in his human relations; but, like his mentor, he has often shown himself cunning.

When Ulbricht returned to Germany in the wake of the Soviet armies, the land which today has become the German Democratic Republic was in ruins. Although the Soviets collected more than $10 billion in reparations, and substantial additional damage was caused by West German machinations, the GDR, under Ulbricht's direction, has become a major industrial country. Among Communist-ruled countries it is second only to the USSR. Soviet-East German trade exceeds America's trade with Britain.

As everywhere in Eastern Europe, the consolidation of Communist power in the GDR was punctuated by political turmoil. But in contrast to all other Communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe, not a single leader was executed or made to confess horrendous crimes. Although some of Ulbricht's rivals and critics were jailed, almost all today once again hold jobs in the middle echelons.

A self-educated worker's son, himself a one-time carpenter, outwardly unprepossessing, with a squeaky voice (similar to that of Bismarck) and—to the average German—a funny Saxon accent, Ulbricht was smart enough to pick up every acceptable Communist reform project and practical enough to make it work. Prof. Yevsei Liberman's economic reform idea, which was never fully applied in the Soviet Union, was taken over by Ulbricht's planners and adapted to an organizational structure with roots in the German administrative and economic tradition.

Ulbricht's merit consisted in harnessing the Prussian tradition of public service to the building of a new kind of state-Socialist society linked with Russia. For that reason he has been called subservient to the Kremlin, yet he remained utterly German. One of the most remarkable things about him as a person is that in his long association with the Russians he never learned their language.

Ulbricht's resignation at a special session of his party's central committee was typical of his political realism. Had he resigned at the party congress or shortly thereafter, his stepping down would have struck almost everyone as the result of a party cabal or inspired by Russia. Indirectly, his resignation may be connected with Moscow's efforts to hasten an East-West understanding about the status of West Berlin. Ulbricht symbolizes for many West Germans everything they hate in the GDR. By withdrawing to a position of influence behind the scene, the veteran party leader may have hoped once again to further the Kremlin's policy, which he has always identified with German Communist interests.

PAUL WOHL

WHY THE PING-PONG?

China's Plans: An Informed Guess

O. EDMUND CLUBB

Mr. Clubb served in China as a Foreign Service Officer of the State Department for eighteen years. He was our Consul General there (1947-50), in Peiping, as Peking was then termed. Mr. Clubb is the author of several books including: Twentieth Century China *(Columbia University Press) and* China and Russia: The "Great Game," *to be published in June by Columbia University Press.*

Official Washington, much given to game plans, manifested surprise—but was also described as being "delighted"—when the American Ping-Pong team visited Peking and was received by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. At his press conference of April 23, Secretary of State Rogers said that the United States hoped that the present contacts with China would develop into a "new chapter" in relations between the two countries, instead of simply opening a "new page," as Chou had suggested the week before.

But where Secretary Rogers spoke of relations between countries, Premier Chou, talking to the Ping-Pong players, had said that their visit opened a new page in relations between the Chinese and American *peoples*. He did not forecast any early improvement in relations between the two states. And President Nixon, while stating in his interview of April 16 that his Administration's long-range goals were the normalization of relations between the United States and China and "the ending of the isolation of the mainland China from the world community," said further that we couldn't go that far "in one jump." Referring to his earlier announcement of relaxation of the American trade embargo and of restrictions on the travel of Chinese to the United States, he said flatly that the next move was up to the Chinese.

What might Peking do to satisfy the implied American desire for substantive concessions so that we could get on with the pictured amelioration of Sino-American rela-

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tions? A special Presidential commission has just recommended that the United States seek to have mainland China represented in the United Nations as soon as practicable; however, "Under no circumstances should the U.S. agree to the expulsion of the Republic of China on Taiwan from the U.N."

Will Peking then abandon its demand that the Nationalist delegation be expelled before a Peking delegation assumes China's U.N. seat? It is entirely evident that it will not: why surrender on the road to victory? Or, will Mao Tse-tung's government relax its insistence that the United States renounce its protectorate over Taiwan? Naturally not. It is a fundamental tenet of Peking's policy that Taiwan is Chinese territory and shall, in one way or another, be "liberated." At the SEATO conference in London, Secretary Rogers called on China to undertake a "constructive rather than disruptive role" in Southeast Asia. Will the revolutionary Maoist leadership be inclined, in line with Rogers' suggestion of April 23, "to encourage the North Vietnamese to negotiate a peaceful settlement" of the Indochina war? Inasmuch as Peking has for years exhorted Hanoi to fight on to final victory, a less likely Chinese move would be difficult to imagine. Chou En-lai, speaking on April 25, was convincing when he reaffirmed China's support to the Indochinese revolutionaries in their war against "U.S. aggression."

In this general situation one may discover an "antagonistic contradiction" (as Chairman Mao would term it). By present indications, the Nixon Administration remains committed to the strategic concept formulated by the Eisenhower administration of "containing" China by a network of alliances and military bases garrisoned by U.S. armed forces. The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 is a lineal descendant of the Asia policy conceived by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. But Peking denies the legitimacy of America's implicit claim to be the dominant power in the West Pacific, and aims to eject the American presence from its threatening position on the periphery of East and Southeast Asia. And, since Peking, not Washington, now enjoys the tactical initiative in Sino-American relations, one must ask, why the Ping-Pong gambit?

As an adjunct of the Bandung policy it followed in the mid-1950s, Peking practiced "people-to-people diplomacy." The purpose was to influence political situations by developing pro-Chinese sentiment in other nations. China scored some successes with that device, perhaps most notably in Japan. But in those days the United States was already allied with the Nationalists on Taiwan and was engaged in taking over the political heritage of French colonial rule in Indochina. Presumably, Peking saw no likelihood of influencing the U.S. Government through the American people. It made no such moves during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

Times have now changed in several important respects. The American nation has become in large measure alienated from its government's war policy. The war in Indochina has thrown its national priorities into disorder. On the international markets, the dollar is in distress. In addition, the United States is becoming increasingly isolated in the community of nations as regards both its Southeast Asia policy *and* its China policy. Washington's strategy for containing China has lost the credibility it possessed after the Korean War, *particularly* as a justification of its military actions in Southeast Asia. The United States, in sum, is experiencing setbacks in the Asian arena. China, for its part, has of late been reaping the fruits of a return to the Bandung policy of peaceful coexistence. The voting on the issue of Chinese representation in the U.N. General Assembly last November indicates this gain, as does Peking's establishment of diplomatic relations with some half-dozen countries since then. President Nixon's formulation

The Chinese Dragon

Vadillo, Ovaciones (Mexico)

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of a "long-range goal" of "ending the isolation of the mainland China from the world community" is thus manifestly superfluous: China has already, *in the face of strenuous American efforts to contain it,* achieved a diplomatic breakout.

Logic therefore suggests that Peking, in its new *démarche,* may well have in mind certain results that would be antagonistic to the objectives of Washington's Asian policy, to wit:

(*1*) The buildup of American popular sentiment in favor of relaxed Sino-American relations would make it still more difficult for Washington to continue its support of Taipei in the General Assembly vote on Chinese representation next fall.

(*2*) Insofar as a "thaw" advances in Sino-American relations, if only between the two peoples, the authority and prestige of the Nationalist rule on Taiwan will automatically be undermined. And the Nationalists, our "allies," are Peking's enemy.

(*3*) The new development in Sino-American relations, having had such reverberations in Washington, naturally intrigues other capitals as well. It must be assumed that this development too is a part of Peking's calculation. The Chinese leadership probably anticipates that the moves vis-à-vis the United States may also influence events to China's benefit in both Japan and the Soviet Union—two centers of power that intimately concern Peking.

(*4*) Finally, Peking may wish to create an amicable climate in the American nation in anticipation of events in Indochina. The critical stage in the Nixon strategy of Vietnamization is fast approaching; the President is under urgent political pressure to prove the validity of that concept before November 1972. If Peking sees reason to fear that impending events threaten a new dangerous confrontation in Southeast Asia between China, committed to the revolutionary cause, and the United States, committed to the counterrevolution, it might well think it good tactics to build up a reservoir of favorable sentiment in the American nation and elsewhere, thus to exercise restraint on the U.S. Government.

So the next move is up to the Chinese? Peking might indeed flash a "signal" by agreeing to resume at Warsaw the ambassadorial meetings begun back in 1955, during Dulles' foreign policy reign. But such a signal should not be misread: major Chinese concessions to Washington's wishes respecting the fundamental issues outstanding in Sino-American relations are not to be expected. China's people-to-people diplomacy is designed for *China's* benefit, in circumstances where Peking feels that the balance of political forces is on its side. □

THE NEW, NEW SOUTH

SOME PROGRESS, MORE MYTH

ROBERT W. DIETSCH
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Atlanta

Almost a century ago, Henry W. Grady, editor of the *Atlanta Constitution*, went north to preach the gospel that a "new South" was emerging in the wake of four years of civil war and Appomattox. A "new South" already rid of secession, soon to be free of slavery, rapidly filling up with progress and freedom. The North applauded what it heard, turned its back, refused to disbelieve even when the Supreme Court in *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* decreed that separate could be equal.

Grady's "new South" turned out to be myth. Slavery, although abolished by constitutional amendment, was never converted into freedom for blacks. The eleven states which had banded together to separate themselves from the Union stuck together in sectional isolation. While economic sunshine flooded the rest of the Union, the sun never quite rose over Dixie.

Today, other men are preaching of a "new, new South," a region of surging economic growth, agricultural shift, political upheaval and, most important, social revolution. Statistics and events seem to support this contemporary sermon:

¶In the 1960s, for the first time since the Civil War, the South gained more people through immigration than it lost through emigration. About 1.4 million blacks left during the decade, but 1.8 million whites moved in.

¶Personal income more than doubled during the 1960s; the average national growth was 90 per cent.

¶The South gained 41 per cent more factory jobs, double the national increase.

¶Spending per school student in Dixie jumped 100 per cent; the national average increase was 77 per cent.

¶Some 665 blacks, according to the Voter Education Project, hold elected public office in the South today. Last fall, 370 blacks sought office, and 110 were elected. In 1960, 1.5 million Southern blacks were registered to vote; today the total is 3.5 million, 18 per cent of all registrants.

¶The South's "new politics" has the Governors of South Carolina, Florida, Georgia and even Alabama pledging equal rights for all, black as well as white. Black faces are showing up in political jobs, pushing pencils as well as brooms.

¶By federal statistics, there is less school segregation in the South today than in the North.

No wonder, then, the gospel of a "new, new South." But as in Grady's day, this gospel is still more myth than fact, and it may revert to pure myth if the North, and Washington, turn their backs again in the belief that the sun has finally, and permanently, come up in Dixie.

The charts and the statistics do show substantial

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economic gains in the South over the last decade. But in relative terms the South has fared far less well. Here's the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, writing on "The Southeast at the Turn of the Decade:"

> The curtain has come down on what had been heralded as the "Soaring Sixties" even before the decade began. Has this prediction come true as far as the economy of the Southeast is concerned? On the surface, the answer is a resounding "yes." By almost every statistic, the economy experienced fantastic growth in the Sixties. Personal income, the best regional yardstick available, more than doubled. . . . [But] Southeastern economic growth looks less spectacular when one takes population growth into account and considers that other regions have also experienced considerable economic growth over the last 10 years. Per capita income in the Southeast has inched only slightly closer to the national average. If, as some Southerners believe, the Southeast should accelerate its long-term growth rate, the Sixties, in fact, did fall short of such a goal. Per capita income, relative to the rest of the country, increased much less rapidly in the Sixties than in the Fifties. Between 1949 and 1959 per capita income in the Southeast climbed from 66 per cent of the national average to 75 per cent. In 1969, it averaged about 78 per cent.

And here is a paragraph from the *New South,* a magazine published by the Southern Regional Council:

> The harsh fact of the matter is that the southern white man has less opportunity to develop his talents, earn a decent income, participate in the national affluence and develop the full resources of his humanity than his fellow citizens in any other section of the United States. Of the 10 states with the lowest per capita income, nine are southern states. (West Virginia is the other.) The median family income for the entire South is $6,700, about $2,000 less than the family income in every other section of the country. Because their income is at the bottom of the scale, so are the resources devoted to education; the southern pupil, black and white, has less spent on his education than his counterparts in the rest of the country. As for poverty, there is not only more of it in the South, but you have 50 per cent more poor white families than poor black families. The median income of the poor white family in the South is actually 20 per cent less than the poor black.

Business is moving South, in many instances motivated by a desire to be nearer expanding markets and to enjoy somewhat cleaner air and cleaner water. But the prime motivation is nonunionized labor, which is plentiful and relatively cheap. About one in every three nonagricultural workers in Ohio, California and Pennsylvania belongs to a labor union; the figure is 20 per cent in Alabama, 17 per cent in Georgia, 14 per cent in Mississippi, 15 per cent in South Carolina and 7.5 per cent in North Carolina. Not a single textile plant in North Carolina is organized, and for the South as a whole textile mill workers earn an average $2.40 an hour, 92¢ an hour less than they do in the North. The major labor unions have made some organizing gains in the South, but not many. Carl E. Farris, a young labor organizer with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), concedes that, thanks to less discrimination and federal equal employment laws, blacks stand a better chance to land a job today than they did ten years ago. But Farris also notes: "Too many jobs in the South still pay the minimum of $1.60 an hour." Moreover, while there is less job discrimination, some employers—particularly smaller textile shops—steer clear of blacks on the ground that they are quicker than Southern whites to join unions. It is a fact that they are.

The point is that when it comes to labor, the "new, new South" is still imprisoned in a web of illusion, still unable to realize that cheap labor acts as a depressant on the economy and the region. Taylor Webb, president of the Mississippi Economic Council, the largest statewide business organization in Mississippi, spoke recently as follows to a group of businessmen:

> It is not in your interest to build an economy around a cheap labor force. It is a disservice to people. A competitive labor force, yes, but if the products manufactured in Mississippi are to be sold nationally at competitive prices, then the employees should be paid a competitive wage instead of the savings in the form of profits leaving the state to those, but not all, nonresident stockholders who are attracted to Mississippi by tax exemptions and cheap labor. The future emphasis should be on upgrading the labor force, thereby offering more productive labor and not human bargains.

No doubt in the sixteen years since the Supreme Court's *Brown* v. *Board of Education* desegregation decision, and since the passage of various federal anti-discrimination and voting rights laws, there has been a great social upheaval in the South, if not the country. The racial caste system is disappearing, but there again the "new, new South" is myth as well as fact.

So far, the surprising series of pledges from Southern governors to work against racial discrimination are words and not deeds. Southern state legislatures, which must approve most gubernatorial proposals, have been ranked by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures the most ineffectual group of lawmaking bodies in the country. Based on the categories of "function," "accountability," "being informed" and "representative," the Alabama legislature was ranked 50, North Carolina 47, Arkansas 46, Georgia 45, South Carolina 44 and Mississippi 42. (Florida, surprisingly, ranked 4.)

As Horace Barker writes in *New South*: "In the heart of 'states rights' country, no state has yet seen fit to take advantage of the 1968 Federal Fair Housing Act's provisions encouraging states to do the job on open housing so Washington will not have to. Twenty-four states are reported to have enacted open housing 'substantially equivalent' to the Federal act as of the end of 1970, thus enabling them to receive complaints that otherwise must go to Washington. Not one of the Southern states was among them." About 375 American cities now have local open housing ordinances; only twelve of these were passed in the South. As noted above, 370 blacks sought political office in the South last November and 110 were elected. Another way to put it, of course, is that 260 were defeated. The fact is that no Southern black can be elected unless his constituency is made up of a black majority, and then only if a majority of registrants are black. The situation is not much better up North, but it does not take the form of a rule—witness Carl Stokes in Cleveland, Richard Hatcher in Gary, Rep. Ronald Dellums in California and Sen. Edward Brooke in Massachusetts.

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It has yet to be proved that a white can get elected in the South by running an outright biracial campaign, although—as events since January show—he may sing a different tune after taking his oath. Thus Fred Gray of Tuskegee, Ala.—one of two blacks in the state legislature—says of the "new" George Wallace: "We will have to wait to see what happens. There has been no change of action yet." And in Atlanta, Julian Bond, also in the legislature, says of Gov. Jimmy Carter and of his assertion that the "time for racial discrimination is over": "You've got to remember that 'good' is a very relative term in Georgia."

Despite the inaugural speech rhetoric by the new governors and despite some change of white conscience, which now says it is no longer good business to discriminate flagrantly, the "new, new South" remains controlled by the men who helped perpetuate the Grady myth and who served the region poorly. George Corley Wallace may have sounded liberal when he stood on the capital steps in Montgomery last January, but nonetheless he was the same Wallace who advised people in Mobile to defy federal law by placing their children in schools of their choice. Next door, in Mississippi, Gov. John Bell Williams not only counseled resistance to school desegregation but dramatized his personal opposition by enrolling his children in private school. (To his credit, Virginia Gov. Linwood Holton sent his daughter to a predominately black school.) Georgia's Carter, whether he prove middle of the roader or not, already is facing the fact that his lieutenant governor, Lester Maddox, is itching to regain the governorship and to pounce on any Carter liberalism, ax handle at the ready.

The white school boards and the white superintendents who now say they are acceding to court-ordered school desegregation are the same white men who continue to demote or fire hundreds of black school supervisors and teachers. On this score, the Race Relations Information Center, from its headquarters in Nashville, reports that "the apparent effect of desegregation on black teachers across the South (in 1970) has been more negative than positive. Hundreds of black teachers have been demoted, dismissed outright, denied new contracts, or pressured into resigning, and the teachers hired to replace them include fewer and fewer blacks."

In the end, what cracked the myth of the new South was the black revolt, the force of biracial pressure from the North and—most important—decisions by the Supreme Court and statutes enacted by the federal government, and enforced by that government. All those pressures and forces are now to some degree dissipated: the black movement is fragmented and still searching for a leader to replace Martin Luther King, Jr. The vigorous, brave bands of young white liberals which roamed the South through most of the sixties are gone, and white Northern liberals who were once sympathetic to the black Southerners are preoccupied with social problems closer to home. As Paul M. Gaston of the Southern Regional Council writes: "In student radical circles, where the crusade for integration was once a passionate concern, the issue has been shelved along with other passé delusions of the liberal establishment." The Warren Court has given way to the Burger-Blackmun Court and Johnson has vacated the White House for Nixon, who gives no sign of trying to revive the once tight-knit alliance between civil rights forces and the federal government. In general, the Nixon Administration takes the attitude that there is indeed a "new, new South," where school desegregation is an accomplished fact and where blacks now have it made.

In the last fifteen years the South has indeed changed, and the spate of federal laws and heightened political power of the blacks make full reversion of the "new, new South" gospel from reality to myth more difficult than it was in Grady's day. Nonetheless, if the nation turns its back the sun may once again set on Dixie. As shown at the beginning of this article, statistics can deceive, and the Administration is on record with some deceptive number games when describing progress in the South. Last fall, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare announced that 97 per cent of the South's school districts (2,624 out of 2,700) were desegregated; but later studies, by HEW and private organizations, showed things were not quite that rosy: only 38.1 per cent of Southern black students today are enrolled in *schools* (as opposed to *districts*) with a predominately white student body, and another 20.4 per cent are in schools that are predominately black (from 50 per cent to 80 per cent). A survey by six civil rights-oriented organizations showed that of 467 school districts monitored last September, 273 showed classroom segregation. Concluded the study: "The separation was sometimes arranged without apology or justification, but more frequently as the consequence of a greatly expanded 'ability tracking' system, a method of assignment that has been widely perverted to perpetuate segregation."

The racial feelings which perpetuated the myth of the "new South" remain real and powerful, and not only in the Southern tier. Social progress is often tenuous and sometimes ephemeral, and there are some signs to indicate

Huffaker, News & Observer (Raleigh)

"Suh, Strom Thurmond's the Name"

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that already parts of the old, oppressive compact are being resealed in the South—and even across the country. Southern economic and social poverty were promoted for almost a century by the exploitation and neglect of the North and by the North's powerful allies in the South. It took the full force of Washington to break up that alliance, and it will take a continuing force from Washington to prevent a new linkup. Not too long ago, the Washington Research Project and several friendly groups concluded that "the progress of desegregation is in imminent danger of failure if new and stronger policies are not implemented at the federal level." It is a warning that the Nixon White House has not heard, or if it has, the Administration has chosen deliberately to ignore it. □

CONVERSION TO PEACE

Reorganizing the Lines of Power

DEREK SHEARER
Mr. Shearer, co-editor of The Pentagon Watchers *(Doubleday), is completing a study of the politics of economic conversion, to be published in 1972.*

Like the phrase "new national priorities," the term "conversion" has become in the past year a favorite of many liberal groups and politicians. Its use reflects a concern that, for too long, the military-industrial sector of the economy has monopolized the country's resources, while pressing domestic needs have gone unmet.

The difficulty in translating this legitimate anxiety into effective political action is shown by the many interpretations given to conversion, and by the confusion that often surrounds discussion of the subject, especially when legislation is proposed to achieve conversion. This was demonstrated at the end of March when the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy—an organization of religious, peace, labor and scientific groups, including the National Council of Churches, Women Strike for Peace, SANE, Americans for Democratic Action, the United Auto Workers and the Federation of American Scientists—sponsored a conference on economic conversion. The sessions were held on March 31 and April 1 in the new Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill, where a host of speakers, including Senators McGovern, Cranston, Kennedy, Mathias and Proxmire, addressed some 500 participants.

Sen. Alan Cranston (D., Calif.) answered the question posed by conference organizers, "Can Defense Firms Undertake Meaningful Work?," with a confident "Yes." Said Cranston, "There's no big secret in how to direct American arms production into domestic channels. All you need to do is make the switch profitable. . . . Under our system, the profit and the good pay are sufficient motives in themselves." Cranston advocated that the government reorder priorities and let contracts in domestic areas. The defense firms, he promised, will follow the dollar.

Ken Bannon, international vice president of the United Auto Workers, shared Cranston's faith in the defense industry and free enterprise. He told the audience that the aerospace firms can meet civilian needs, converting to civilian-oriented production with proper government help.

Ernest Fitzgerald, the former Air Force cost expert who was fired by the Pentagon for revealing cost overruns on the C-5A transport, took issue with such optimism. He spoke of the inefficiency of the aerospace dinosaurs, and told an amusing story about one defense firm which "invented" the tent when an observation post was needed at Minuteman missile sites in Montana; another company, in charge of launch-control centers for Minuteman, "invented" the bed on an $88,500 contract. When the General Accounting Office looked into the transaction, it turned out that the firm had not really invented the bed but had purchased Army cots for $23 each and attached brackets to their legs, so that they could be fastened to the floor. Fitzgerald used these episodes to illustrate what occurs on more sophisticated weapons problems; he questioned whether such firms could ever compete in the civilian market.

Fitzgerald's advice was: "Stop worrying about the giant contractors . . . concentrate on helping people convert. The problems of conversion are not economic in the most basic sense but political. Bridging the gap for individuals will overcome most political obstacles and preserve human skills."

In the question-and-answer period, one participant asked Bannon whether, in light of Fitzgerald's comments on aerospace management, the UAW would be willing to convert the aerospace factories themselves, particularly those, like Lockheed's plant in Marietta, Ga., that are mostly government-owned. Bannon replied, "We think Lockheed is a fine company and can do the job." When pressed on whether the workers could run these factories, Bannon said the UAW had no quarrel with management over who should run the factories. His position was that management has its proper role and labor knows its place.

Senator McGovern stressed the plight of employees in the military-industrial sector. "They are held in economic bondage, with no choice but to hope for a new federal contract when the old one ends, or failing in that, for some meaningful federal help when disaster strikes.

"Quite frankly," McGovern said on the point of redirecting public funds, "I have strong doubts whether we can extract large amounts from the military sector unless we can first deal with these anxieties and their resultant political pressure."

McGovern's solution is his bill titled the Peacetime Transition Act, sponsored jointly by Sen. Charles Mathias and introduced by Rep. Jonathan Bingham and others in the House. The basic provision of the bill is that 12.5 per

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cent of each defense contractor's profits is to be set aside in a conversion reserve, held in trust by the National Commission on Peacetime Transition. The funds would be used for two purposes: to finance the realization of conversion plans developed by the contractor, and to pay benefits to workers laid off by the contractor because of decreasing defense work. Once the contractor has converted, he may reclaim all of the funds remaining in his reserve, with interest and free of tax.

During the transition process, a contractor may borrow impounded funds to finance civilian production. The worker's benefits, to run for not more than two years, would maintain his salary at the level it had reached before he was laid off, downgraded, or placed on a short work week. Pension credits, health and life insurance, and retraining and relocation expenses are also included. The program of workers' benefits would be administered by state employment agencies. The contractor is deemed to have converted when he has operated for two years with no defense work. Once the bill was enacted, all defense contracts would require the contractor to file a conversion plan for the production facilities involved.

At the suggestion of Prof. Seymour Melman of Columbia University, McGovern plans to introduce the Emergency Occupational Conversion Bill, which provides grants of up to twelve months for production workers who have lost their jobs because of cuts in defense spending. The bill provides additional funds for relocation expenses and extends benefits to eighteen months if the individuals involved are undergoing retraining.

McGovern first introduced a version of the Economic Transition Act in the fall of 1963. Hearings were held in 1964 before the Commerce Committee, but the bill was never reported out of committee. He reintroduced the bill in 1968 and, at hearings before the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, Walter Reuther, UAW chief, suggested a major addition—the placing of a percentage of contractors' profits in a conversion reserve. Along with this incentive plan, the national commission to be created by the bill would convene a national conference to encourage state and local planning for conversion. The chairman of this commission would be the Secretary of Labor—a change from 1968 when the Secretary of Commerce was given the place of honor; this minor alteration no doubt reflects Presidential candidate McGovern's concern for the labor vote. The commission would also include the members of the Cabinet; the chairmen of the AEC and the Council of Economic Advisers; the administrator of NASA; the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; three representatives each from business and labor, and up to five additional members and an executive secretary to be appointed by the President.

The motive behind the bill—the need to plan for peace—is laudable, but it is doubtful that, were it ever to be enacted (which is unlikely in the near future, now that McGovern is a declared candidate), it would achieve its author's declared purpose of providing "a long-range continuing program to facilitate transfers out of military programs. . . ." First, defense profits are difficult if not impossible to calculate accurately. Defense firms, when asked to list profits, give estimates substantially lower than those discovered by a GAO audit of specific contracts (see *Nation* editorial, April 12). And defense firms, as economist Richard Kaufman discloses in *The War Profiteers*, reap hidden profits through the use of government-owned property, progress payments, padded overhead expenses and outright fraud.

Moreover, the large firms such as Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics, Litton, etc., are, as John Kenneth Galbraith stated in a Sunday *New York Times Magazine* last year, really public firms with "private" management—what radical economists call military or state capitalism. There is no valid reason why such firms should be assisted into the civilian market at the taxpayers' expense. The proposal to create yet another executive commission is also dubious. That device of government has not proved effective in other areas in the past, the Commission on Civil Disorders, Commission on Violence, etc.

McGovern's other bill, to provide increased benefits for unemployed defense workers, is not harmful, but prompts one to ask why the whole range of unemployment benefit programs should not be improved and include, among other stipulations, a guaranteed annual income. A decent society should provide for its workers in periods when it cannot offer them gainful employment.

Sen. Edward Kennedy, who addressed the conference on the day after Senator McGovern spoke, has introduced the other major piece of conversion legislation in Congress—the Conversion Research, Education and Assistance Act of 1971. Similar bills, with a few minor differences, have been introduced in the House. Speaking of his bill, Mr. Kennedy said:

> The specific programs authorized by the bill are primarily aimed at enabling individual scientists and engineers to convert their talents from defense-related activities to civilian-related activities, particularly those which promise to aid in the resolution of the nation's most urgent social programs. . . .
>
> Thus, of the $449 million which the bill authorizes for the use of the National Science Foundation, $225 million would be distributed directly in Conversion Fellowships to individual scientists, engineers, and technicians. These Conversion Fellowships would provide the unemployed professionals with the funds to participate in conversion retraining programs. The Fellowships would include allowances for family support, health insurance, subsequent job placement, relocation expenses and other related purposes.
>
> Another $65 million would enable the NSF to fund the establishment of Community Conversion Corporations in communities severely affected by defense and space cutbacks. The Community Conversion Corporations would be nonprofit organizations designed to channel civilian research and development funds into the affected communities, and to provide immediate on-the-job retraining for unemployed scientists and engineers.
>
> Another $45 million would be authorized for grants by the NSF to state and local governments to carry out conversion planning and support programs to assist specific localities, and to hire unemployed scientists, engineers and technicians to fill technical positions at the state and local level.

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In addition, the Small Business Administration would be authorized to spend $45 million for direct grants to small scientific and technical firms to enable their personnel to participate in conversion training programs. SBA would also utilize a revolving fund for guaranteed loans and assistance payments to encourage small business firms to carry out conversion projects, including necessary changes in facilities and equipment.

Kennedy's bill might better be titled "The Route 128 Relief Act," since it is a piece of class legislation aimed at helping an important segment of Kennedy's constituency over the current economic slump (unemployment among professionals in the electronics-defense plants clustered along Boston's Route 128 is close to 15 per cent). The bill will be welcomed by unemployed scientists and engineers and small R&D companies, but it really fails to deal with a crucial point: more research, planning and retraining for conversion itself is not enough. Numerous studies done for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in years past have shown that the skills of most engineers and scientists in the defense sector are transferable. The problem is where these people are to be employed and what needs they can meet; in short, what market there is for technical skills in the society. Public money is very much needed in the fields of health, education, transportation, pollution control, etc., but it is not currently available. In fiscal year 1971, out of a total federal R&D budget of $15.8 billion, 12.5 billion supported the Pentagon, NASA and the AEC. Moreover, America must make up its mind to deal seriously with domestic problems—which, in addition to making more funds available, means reorganizing the society so that the money spent really brings about the changes desired.

One idea, absent from the Kennedy bill, but proposed at the conference by Prof. John Ullman of Hofstra University, is the creation of public interest engineering firms, modeled on the public interest law firms inspired by Ralph Nader. These would protect the public interest in technical matters and would engage in engineering projects which a public community-development corporation might decide to pursue. Ullman also suggested "getting a lot of engineers who have been glorified clerks for too long" (in the aerospace industry, many engineers spend their time writing proposals for government contracts) to enter such new occupations as safety inspectors for government at the state and local levels. Ullman also supported "making all relief schemes universal," rather than writing specific legislation for one or another economic class or category of worker. In effect, he seconded Ernest Fitzgerald's plea that the government should help the people, not the defense firms.

But Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.), the leading Congressional critic of the military-industrial complex, put the most relevant and tough-minded question to the conference. "What conversion?" he asked. "In the last three years, the Pentagon spent $77 billion a year for defense. This year, Pentagon spending is almost $75 billion. But next year, the President is asking for new budget authority of $77.6 billion for the Pentagon and $80.2 billion for total national defense. Why is there a conversion problem when military spending is going up?"

While well-meaning people discuss conversion, the Nixon Administration is shifting resources not from military to domestic needs, as many people believe, but from military manpower to military hardware. That is evident from Secretary Laird's 1971 defense posture statement, "Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence." In his introduction, Laird grandly proclaims, "This five-year defense program is keyed to the twin objectives set forth by President Nixon for the last third of the 20th century: achievement for the first time in this century of a generation of peace; and in the process, enhancement of the quality of life for all Americans, while helping to improve it for all the peoples of the world."

It is doubtful, however, that peace and plenty will be realized with a program that projects weapons systems which will cost taxpayers billions of dollars in the decades to come. *The National Journal* of January 23 lists thirty-six major weapons systems that will require almost $60 billion in additional funds. Another 100 weapons systems, for which no accurate cost figures are available, will most likely add billions more.

In the strategic area, George Rathjens, former science adviser to President Eisenhower and now a professor at M.I.T., specified in testimony before a subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee last June the following systems and their estimated total cost (in billions):

Minuteman III	$ 5
Poseidon	6
B-1 Bomber	10
SCRAM (Short Range Attack Missile)	1
SCAD (Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy)	1
Safeguard ABM	11
Minuteman superhardening	6
ULMS (Underwater long-range missile system)	8
Total	$48

Rathjens noted that the estimates are conservative and do not include probable cost overruns. In addition to costing a great deal, these systems, especially the installation of MIRVs on Poseidon missiles and Minuteman missiles, signal a new stage in the arms race. Even if the SALT talks arrived at a limited agreement (which seems improbable, given Secretary Laird's latest hysterical announcement of a "new" Soviet ICBM threat), that would not halt the momentum. According to a *New York Times* dispatch of December 7, 1970, "High administration officials do not expect significant cutbacks in the Defense Department's $8 billion-a-year budget for strategic arms as a result of *any* arms limitation agreement that may be signed with the Soviet Union." (Emphasis added.)

As a comment on Laird's "realistic deterrence," Professor Rathjens told the Joint Economic subcommittee that adequate protection could be obtained with only 100 nuclear warheads; 300 was the total that Secretary McNamara declared sufficient. The United States can now deliver more than 4,000 strategic warheads against the Soviet Union; and that figure will be almost tripled by 1975, when MIRVs are completely installed. In addition, the United States now has 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe and at least 3,000 in Asia.

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In the area of conventional forces, the Nixon Doctrine is a pretext for reducing American manpower in underdeveloped countries and replacing it with military aid to native armies and the application of American technological firepower. Such a strategy will not be cheap for American taxpayers. Calculations from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee place the figure for military aid this year between $4 billion and $7 billion, and there is little reason to suppose that the figure will drop in the future. The Army has embarked on the development of the electronic battlefield, which employs sensors, computers and other electronic instruments to pinpoint the "enemy" and direct firepower on him. *Business Week* estimates that this gadgetry will cost at least $20 billion in coming years (companies profiting from the new procurement include RCA, Westinghouse, Honeywell, General Electric, ITT, Hughes and Litton).

There is no guarantee that Nixon's low-profile strategy will work. In which case, American forces will again intervene overseas when client armies are unable to defeat an insurgent revolutionary movement.

Taken together, the Administration's strategic and conventional force strategies promise a continuing high level of defense expenditures in the seventies. And, as Senator Proxmire notes, there will be no conversion problem to worry about until that direction is dramatically reversed.

One of the few speakers at the conference to deal with the budget question—outside of Seymour Melman, who can be counted on to attack the defense budget—was Sol M. Linowitz, chairman of the National Urban Coalition. Linowitz discussed the Coalition's proposed counterbudget. He told the audience:

> *Counterbudget* recommends reducing military spending from its present level of $74.5 billion a year to $50 billion a year by 1973. . . . In preparing these defense proposals, we undertook an exhaustive analysis of enemy threats and resultant U.S. force requirements in the 1970s. . . . Our analysis indicated that a wisely allocated $50 billion annual investment in military programs would provide necessary protection against military threats; and that the nation's well-being would be best served by reallocating the remaining $24 billion now spent by the Pentagon for use in solving our pressing domestic problems.

That was one of the most useful proposals made at the conference. The only problem is that Linowitz said little about how this reduction could be achieved politically. Indeed, the failure to discuss seriously how to build a political consensus capable of bringing about reduced defense budgets, and consequently some conversion of industrial production, was the biggest flaw of the conference. Unfortunately it is a flaw that typifies most talk about conversion today.

The trouble is that liberal advocates of conversion do not understand how integral defense spending is to the American economy. As Bernard Nossiter notes in *The Mythmakers*, "The plain fact is that the New Deal did not end the nation's massive unemployment; World War II did it." Depression fled with the war buildup; money became available for expansion of private plants and the government built billions of dollars worth of new facilities. Economist Robert J. Gordon, writing in the *American Economic Review*, estimates that since 1940 the U.S. Government has purchased $45 billion worth of plant and equipment for the use of private firms, most of them defense contractors.

The successful conversion of the economy to peace after World War II is often cited as evidence that conversion now could be accomplished without great trouble. But, as Nossiter explains, "When peace came in 1945, the economy was vastly different from the one we live in now. . . . With rising incomes and fewer goods on which to spend them, consumers had piled up $160 billion of savings during the war. . . . By 1944, consumers were saving more than one dollar of every four they earned. After the war, this backlog of effective demand was turned loose on cars, refrigerators, homes, clothing, phonographs, television sets, vacations, schools, roads, and all the other goods and services that were rationed or nonexistent during the war. By 1947, consumers were saving less than three of every hundred dollars they earned. Their great outpouring filled much of the gap left by the withdrawal of the government from the marketplace."

Firms which had been in the civilian market before the

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war—automobiles, rubber, steel, etc.—had little trouble returning to their traditional lines of business. "In contrast, however," Murray Weidenbaum, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, explained to a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee last year, "the aerospace companies had typically grown during the wartime period from small job-shop operations to large industrial enterprises. The virtual or at least temporary disappearance of their basic market when the war ended brought fundamental problems of adjustment."

These firms attempted to diversify into the consumer market. Some began to produce busses, trolley coaches, marine engines, aluminum canoes and sports boats; others even ventured into such fields as coin changing machines, dry-cleaning apparatus, artificial hands and midget racing cars. Weidenbaum testifies:

> In general, the income from these new ventures was disappointing. They did not generate a significant fraction of the sales attained during World War II; the profits were often negative. This was illustrated by the experience of the major aerospace companies during the initial postwar adjustment period, 1946-48, when sales declined to a tenth of their former peak and losses totaled over $50 million.
>
> Most of the diversification activities by the major aerospace companies which were begun at the end of World War II were abandoned as unsuccessful or marginal or sold to firms traditionally oriented to industrial or consumer markets. The expansion of the military budget brought on by the Korean war soon turned attention of these firms back to the military market.

Walter Reuther proposed in 1944 that government-owned defense facilities be converted to produce low-cost housing and high-speed railroad transportation under the auspices of a TVA-type public authority, with worker participation in the running of the plants. The idea was labeled "socialistic" by *Business Week* and like-minded magazines and was dismissed by the government.

But even though the consumer-demand situation is vastly different today from what prevailed at the end of World War II, the U.S. economy, in theory at least, could get along prosperously without defense spending. Reports from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, including the latest massive study, "Adjustments of the U.S. Economy to Reductions in Military Spending," have repeatedly made that point. However, such studies have concluded that the policies needed to maintain employment and growth must include a substantial increase in public spending for nonmilitary goods.

Weidenbaum, in a 1969 paper, "The Economic Environment after Vietnam," noted five important facts about the role of military spending in the U.S. economy:

¶Military programs account for four-fifths of goods and services purchased by the federal government.

¶Military programs engage a major share of the scientific and engineering talent in the United States and finance one-third of the country's R&D (much of what passes for R&D in non-defense companies is styling and packaging).

¶Because of the specialized nature of military procurement—mostly high technology weapons systems—a relatively few durable goods industries provide most of these needs. These industries have been among the leading growth industries in the United States since the end of World War II and the regions in which they are concentrated have been among the fastest growing.

¶Capital items produced for the Pentagon comprised one-fourth of the production of new plant and equipment in the economy of 1967.

¶Also in 1967, defense spending accounted directly for 10 per cent of U.S. employment. Taking into account the jobs which defense activity generates in the rest of the economy, approximately 20 per cent of combined civilian and military jobs was dependent on military spending (the current figure is less because of recent cutbacks in DOD manpower).

It is clear that military spending has been the Keynesian device that has propelled the U.S. economy in the fifties and sixties, stimulated growth, subsidized technology, and prevented depression. Emile Benoit of Columbia University noted in a 1962 report for the Arms Control Agency, a "block to the acceptance of a satisfactory adjustment program is the widespread hostility to an expansion of federal non-defense programs. Despite widespread propaganda to the contrary, the fact is that real federal non-defense expenditures on goods and services (i.e., discounting for price increases) have been declining for years, and on a per-capita basis are 37 per cent less than in 1939—this despite foreign economic aid, the space program, and everything else. Moreover, real non-defense purchases of all government units (including state and local) have dropped from 16 to 12 per cent of GNP between these years. Federal non-defense expenditures on goods and services are now so low that they would have to double in order to provide the 'balanced offsets' . . ." needed to maintain reasonably full employment and growth in the event of drastic cuts in defense spending. Weidenbaum, using more recent figures, comes to a similar conclusion.

Defense spending does not threaten business interests because the money goes to private firms and the products —weapons—do not compete with other commercial enterprises. As economist Paul Sweezy has written, "There is no end of useful projects which government could undertake at any given time—*if* it were free to compete with private enterprise. But of course government is not free to compete with private enterprise; in fact it is here that the resistance of the capitalists to the extension of government activities is at its maximum."

Given this analysis, it appears that the call for conversion is the kind of non-reformist reform that Belgian economist André Gorz discusses in *Strategy for Labor*. A non-reformist reform, writes Gorz, "is one which is conceived not in terms of what is possible within the framework of a given system and administration, but in view of what should be made possible in terms of human needs and demands.

"In other words, a struggle for non-reformist reforms —for anti-capitalist reforms—is one which does not base its validity and its right to exist on capitalist needs, criteria and rationales."

Senators McGovern and Kennedy and other liberal proponents of conversion might be surprised to learn that

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they are, in fact, advocating an anti-capitalist reform. To date, the only major critic of military spending to face the issue has been John Kenneth Galbraith, when he advocated nationalization of the major defense firms. Individuals and groups who are serious about the conversion issue might use Galbraith's suggestion as a starting point for a political platform. A basic plank might be that weapons should not be produced for profit by privately owned companies. Whatever weapons are needed—and they would not be many since, as suggested earlier, there will be resources to convert only if American foreign policy is substantially turned around—should be produced in publicly owned factories. The remaining nationalized facilities, most of which have been financed by taxpayers' money, can be converted to production of low-cost housing, high-speed transportation, fishing boats or whatever the society needs, under community-controlled, public management, as Walter Reuther suggested more than twenty years ago.

Money saved by slashing the defense budget by say $50 billion—a reduction which Professor Melman says can be achieved without even cutting back nuclear overkill—could go to a host of domestic programs, including public-interest engineering firms, public-interest environmental protection firms, to the states in revenue sharing, to cities to rebuild and to clean up, etc.

Such an upsurge in public spending and public production sounds like creeping socialism, but investigation of the conversion problem suggests that socially controlled production and socially oriented government spending is the only viable and desirable alternative to the continuing militarization of the country and its resources.

An alternate policy would be to reduce the defense budget, give the money to the defense firms and let them solve America's domestic problems. Litton might be given the contract to run New York City; General Dynamics could be in charge of Boston, and Lockheed in command of Los Angeles. It is improbable, however, that these firms could provide the public much satisfaction. The systems approach to problems, which is the defense firm's most important asset, works well in getting a man to the moon, but it applies much less aptly in areas with social and political dimensions. The comment of one president of an aerospace company that, "Creating a system to warn a field army the enemy has launched an attack of germ warfare is basically no different from creating a system to control juvenile delinquency," illustrates the difficulty. A democratic America is unlikely to turn over its domestic programs to the defense corporations. If it did, its chance of remaining democratic would be problematic,

As a maverick economist, the late Ben Seligman wrote a few years ago, conversion means "reorganization of the lines along which power is disposed; it means a new political economy." More Americans will have to face that fact before we can hope that the phrase "new national priorities" is more than rhetoric. □

ADDICTION, THE COUNTER-CULTURE

MAC PROCTOR
Mr. Proctor is pottery shop supervisor at Exodus House Narcotics Addiction Center in New York City.

I have often been asked by people who know little about the subject, "What is the answer to the drug problem?" I usually respond in addict jargon: "Different strokes for different folks." The search for "The Answer" implies that somehow there must be a single key to the whole subject. But there is no single concept to explain why people become addicts, and there is no one solution to the addiction problem.

The attack upon narcotics is in an actively experimental stage and varies from the closed-ward treatment initiated at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Ky., to medical techniques that use various substitutes for opiates, to the many types of therapeutic communities. The trend is toward a more humane regard for addicts and away from incarceration, but I have strong reservations about certain of the medical approaches.

To bridge the gap of understanding between the individual of "normal" experience and the addict in treatment, I will describe some aspects of the therapeutic community approach. But first, to provide a perspective from which to view the rehabilitation process, it is necessary to discuss the addict subculture.

Addiction is a counter-culture. I use that term because one of the current myths is that addicts are trying to escape. I see addiction, on the contrary, as a creative process, the creation of an alternative to the culture of the larger society in which it exists. Viewed in this way, addiction can be seen as a social problem many of whose dimensions have not been examined closely by the so-called experts in the field. That is to say, addiction is a political, economic, social, pharmacological and psychological problem. The term counter-culture also implies that the larger society must do some changing before the problem can be handled.

A writer for *The Liberator* (July 1970) summed it up as follows: "There is no quick legal or medical 'fix' for drug addiction. Any such superimposed solution will, at best, only ease the pain of the drug casualties. Only when political struggle, waged by people who are most oppressed in our society, succeeds in changing the conditions which are influencing entire generations to seek fulfillment, economic and spiritual, through drugs, will youth —black, brown and white—feel there is a meaningful alternative to drugs. . . ."

Addicts, young and old alike, do seek fulfillment through drugs. The culture of addiction provides rewards for the oppressed of this society at many levels. The connection between deprivation and drugs is evident: the

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black and brown people of our ghettos are oppressed and the scale of addiction in those areas is enormous as compared with its incidence in white, middle-class America. The current volume of publicity about drugs in suburbia also reveals the oppressive character of priorities concerning addiction. Only when the addict culture started drawing on white America in middle-class areas did the alarm bells start ringing in the major media.

In the counter-culture of addiction the individual finds rewards that he cannot get in the greater society, rewards he is deprived of often by reason of race. The culture of addiction appeals especially to the young. After all, if a boy is told that he doesn't contribute anything to the society, and that he will not be allowed the responsibility or opportunity to contribute to the society, the addict culture is a viable alternative. Those who have been raised in this passive and dependent atmosphere for more than two decades are psychologically sick. And if they are black the problem is compounded. The Rev. Lynn Hageman, director of Exodus House, states:

> The third area of reward has to do with the quest for identity. My researchers tell me that if you ask a man or woman on the street the question, "What are you?," the odds are five out of six that the response will be in terms of vocational role or job. This has not always been true. Two generations ago you would have gotten an equal number of responses in terms of ethnicity, religion, or even family name. The same change is noted in popular manners at cocktail parties where the introduction of strangers is immediately followed by production role identification. Two generations ago, by contrast, talking shop was considered to be extremely bad form.
>
> The one group shut out of this means of self-identification is that group categorized as students. In our society, to be a student is to be preparing to become someone. The implication is clear that the student is nothing now, but, by dint of hard work, application of influence, and perhaps by the grace of God, he may some day be something.
>
> If that caricature is at all true, we ought not to be surprised or scandalized that rather large numbers of young people of all classes respond avidly to a life style in which they are someone. By this, it is to be inferred that the drug-oriented culture provides a production role identity rather quickly to those who are seriously involved. The economic pressures are such that the serious drug user must find an area of endeavor appropriate to his talents and opportunities if he is to survive. Thus, the roles of shoplifter, drug seller, operator of a "shooting gallery," whore, pimp, etc., all meet the economic need, while at the same time giving rewards of status and identity within the circle of peers whose esteem most matters. Skill is rewarded by recognition, and application and perseverance are acknowledged in prosperity and a plenitude of those substances which make life worthwhile.

The addict culture, with its white powder economy, provides alternatives for the individual to create a self-identity, and achieve fulfillment, at least chemically. The need to be an individual, when frustrated, creates feelings of anxiety and hopelessness, feelings which can readily be satisfied by the next "fix."

The following statistics were offered by Rik Kunnes in *The Radical Therapist* (June-July 1970): "There are at least 100,000 heroin addicts in New York City alone on a heroin habit costing an average of $40 per day. To make $40 a day an addict must steal $200 worth of goods a day, 365 days a year. This computes to well over $7 billion per year. . . ."

Primitive man competed with nature in an environment that both limited and assisted him. The best hunter earned esteem because he was an asset to the tribe. His skill was rewarded with those substances which make life worthwhile. In mass society, where man has practically defeated nature, the competition is man against man; society thereby becomes repressive.

Taking care of the habit drives the individual addict to steal or sell drugs. Just as the primitive hunter takes risks against nature to provide food and gain esteem, so the addict hunts daily. This is aptly described in an interview which I had with an ex-addict. I asked, concerning "the habit,"

> Did you feel that it was a growth inside you that completely covered you?
>
> Yes. It comes down and goes all through your body. It's like when you have a chippy,* it's in your mind. When you are a dope fiend you have an image that you have to impress other addicts. To show them that we have a terrible bad habit—you know—our culture or other members. Which means that we are doing a lot of good hustling and we doing good as far as taking care of habit.

For the addict the jungle of the straight society, with its store detectives, police, doormen, and irate citizens, poses dangers very similar to what primitive man experienced in a hunting society. And if it is pointed out that primitive man was hunting in order that he might eat, the answer is that for the addict in the street, addiction takes on the characteristics of a primary need.

The addict's life is a ritual drama centered around feeding the habit. For many, the daily hunt (buying the drug and then shooting up) is so preoccupying that it is the only life they know. The conditioning is so strong that after months or even years in jail the released addict shows symptoms of being addicted. In the interview cited above, I asked:

> When you . . . don't have a habit, where does it go?
>
> It goes to the mind. You don't have a physical—it's not physically—but it's still in your mind. Sometimes when you find yourself coming out of an institution or a jail, or something like that, you right away feel sometimes that it is a physical. Physical already, that you already been months out on the street using dope. And that is the first thing you do is take you shot.

But the addict is not entirely detached from the greater society; he not only lives off it but also incorporates certain of its ideals into his own philosophy. For an addict, the ideal man has one foot in the addict life and the other in the square world:

> He doesn't have to make a million dollars if he can make this physical thing, if he can keep his habit and work too. But today it's almost impossible to be this ideal man, the way the stuff is sold in the city. You can have a connection but you can't go every day and cop

* Using narcotics freely when available.

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in five minutes, sometimes it'll take you an hour; now it's gonna fuck up with your job, take time off from your job, make you blow your job, then you have to get another job to support your habit. It's very hard today. You used to be able to do it in the fifties when there wasn't so much heat. There was always stuff around. That's when you used to be able to keep a habit and work but not today, no more.

Thus one sees what effect the laws of the larger society have had on the addict culture. There is also in the above quotation an element of the nostalgia that all addicts reveal in one way or another. Most often, an addict will say that the stuff is "not what it used to be," the real reason being that it no longer gives him the euphoria he experienced when he started using dope.

The addict culture is, in many ways, an elite culture, at the top of which are the users of heroin. If one is a have-not, then the drug culture is an alternative to achieving, at least chemically, a self-image and a sense of belonging. Seymour Fiddle remarks about the addict culture in *Portraits from a Shooting Gallery*:

> I say this is no accident because I feel that this idea of belonging to an elite culture is a protective device that permits the proletarianized addict to feel that he is a part of a happy few who can understand the experience, the cosmic encounter. Especially, squares with their confident ignorance do not share this encounter.

When I first started working with addicts at Exodus House I was asked by an addict where I was from. I replied I was from Chapel Hill. He then said something like: "Down South, eh? Don't have anything but drugstore junkies there. When I was in Lexington we wouldn't associate with them." This was all new to me then but I see now that even among addicts there is an aristocracy. But it is an aristocracy where no one has advantages by birth. It is an open culture, free of the segregation and discrimination of the greater society, and where activities are personalized and ritualized.

The repressed and alienated individual may or may not turn to drugs. He may choose instead a mental institution or just lie low and keep quiet for a lifetime. But given the condition of society today, a great many will find the culture of addiction. What can be done?

The therapeutic community is an approach to the problem of addiction that takes many forms. "Different strokes for different folks." Some addicts go from program to program until they finally make it. Thus combinations of programs sometimes work, and if there were more therapeutic communities, the success rate of them all would be higher. The therapeutic community deals mainly with the highly motivated individual, not with the masses treated in the medical programs. The medical approach seeks to adjust individuals to society; the therapeutic community seeks to change the individual. It is a radical approach, by which I mean that the member of the community is asked to make a commitment to himself to change.

The addict comes to Exodus House from a wide variety of referrals, ranging from the agencies to the grapevine of addict culture. When he comes in he is either placed in Orientation or, if he is under the influence of drugs, is sent to a hospital for detoxification. If he goes to Orientation he comes in contact with an ex-addict who meets with him five days a week and explains to him the opportunities in the program. He must at this time submit an observed urine specimen six days a week, to prove that he is drug-free.

It is essential that at this level contact, guidance and therapy be under the supervision of an ex-addict, the most important reason being that the candidate is in need of a role model, which only an ex-addict can supply.

Pre-Therapy, the first step into the program, is also directed by an ex-addict; its purpose is to make the individual see and admit the nature of his problems. These are brought out and dealt with in group sessions. Pre-

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Therapy demonstrates to the individual that he can trust his group, and he begins to build confidence not only in other program members and group members but also in the staff. The sessions are held five days a week and last for two hours. At this time, the individual is allowed to enter the main premises of Exodus House. (Orientation is conducted in an adjacent building.) If a bed is available, he is allowed to live there; if not, he must come every morning and stay all day. He is also required to attend large group meetings on Sundays and to begin to avail himself of individualized tutoring in order to improve his reading and writing. This greater involvement reinforces the commitment which the individual has made to change, because he is daily confronted with the change he sees in others.

When the individual has learned to deal significantly with the problems he has acknowledged, he is evaluated by his group, his therapist, the staff, and is moved to the next level of the program: C-Therapy. (Whenever the individual regresses, he is moved to a lower level where he can function more comfortably.)

C-Therapy is the program member's first group under the direction of a professional, who is himself supervised by a psychiatrist. C-Level members are pressed to delve deeper into themselves and to take meaningful actions to cope with their problems. If the individual progresses at this level he is then allowed to start working in one of the shops. C-Shop is an evaluation shop where the person is introduced to tools and materials. He is judged on his ability to work under supervision.

The program member continues to submit observed urine specimens six days a week and has several afternoons and evenings of supervised meetings and tutoring. When he demonstrates an ability to work under supervision he moves to the B-Level.

At this point he is in a shop full time, except when in therapy. Here the emphasis is on the person's relation to work: problems of authority response, productivity values (quality and quantity), the ability to visualize a completed project. The individual begins at this time to start thinking about a vocation. Men at this level begin to represent Exodus House on speaking engagements in the neighborhood and in towns of the area. At some time during the B stage, the member is moved to therapy under the treatment of the staff psychiatrist. This is deep and sophisticated therapy. Men at this level are given many responsibilities, including the program-wide Thursday night meeting, where they choose the topic and manage the proceedings. B-Level members are responsible for the residence in the evenings.

After the member has worked out his vocational plan, progressed in therapy to a point that is judged satisfactory by the staff psychiatrist and his peers, and when his shop work meets the expectations of his supervisor, his fellow shop members, and most important of all, *himself*, he is moved to A-Level.

At A-Level the vocational plan is put into practice. It may be a full-time academic or on-the-job training program. As the member progresses, his therapy is reduced appropriately to his needs. The A-Level is the point of departure, at which time the individual is no longer a 9 to 5 program member at Exodus House but a man facing the realities of life.

The rather elaborate stratification described above was developed to meet several needs, as explained by Lynn Hageman:

(*1*) The addict in East Harlem is not an isolated entity, but functions in the midst of a "culture of addiction." Any program working in the same neighborhood must offer some of the same cultural and social satisfactions. These include a sense of achievement, production status and role, involvement in societal excitement, a sense of belonging to a body of men and women possessing arcane knowledge hidden from outsiders, and subject to a code of ethics and behavior with appropriate rewards and punishments.

(*2*) In a community such as East Harlem, surrogate families must be established to foster the so-called normal patterns of personality development that are not provided by actual families.

(*3*) The addict has found many of his satisfactions in the pseudo-productive activities of the underworld. An exposure to genuinely meaningful productivity, the provision of the tools and skills prerequisite to being productive, and a radical redefinition of productive relationships are essential to deep rehabilitation.

(*4*) A cadre of trained ex-addicts is an essential link in the treatment process, both to free the professional staff for its proper function and to interpret the community and the addict to and for the professional.

(*5*) A group of former addicts coping with life in the midst of the narcotics of East Harlem gives hope to the entire community that the drug addiction can be countered. It is of prime importance that the community come to view narcotic addiction and drug abuse as pathological, thus eliminating the glamour of its underworld aura and freeing the community from the paralysis of its fear.

The stratification of the Exodus House program indicates that the rehabilitation of an addict is not a matter of mere adjustment but a long and involved process of change. Each step toward that change is rewarded by movement to a higher level, and each regression is followed by movement to a lower level. While there is an aura of punishment in the demotion of those who regress, it is robbed of its sting because such discipline does not involve rejection. The individual may come to Exodus House, advance to the C-Level, then leave and still not be written off as a loss. I have seen men return two years later, start over, and complete the program. There are no quick answers; there is no assembly line to make ex-addicts out of junkies. "Different strokes for different folks." In the Exodus House program the member is at all times looked upon as an individual and allowed to change at the rate he chooses. Exodus House does not stage psychiatric marathons, which are coercive devices that attempt to force the individual to change on a competitive basis. The member comes to know who he is and where he is at each level and where he has to go.

Having completed the program, the ex-addict must face the problems of a repressive society and must recognize what he possesses to help him cope with life. First, he has shed his feelings of hopelessness and uselessness. He has changed and must face life, knowing that it may not al-

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ways be fair. He need not be alienated from work, for he has developed an understanding of the essence of work. He has learned to see the world for what it is and, if he must, he will use the system and not be used by it. Through his changes he has learned the craft of living responsibly. He will not oppress himself by seeking false objectives. All in all, the ex-addict is a true revolutionary. The culture of addiction knows this well.

I may seem to be offering a superhuman picture of the ex-addict, but it is basically accurate. Any hero worship merely reveals my admiration for the men and women who complete the Exodus House program and go on to live productive lives. They may have personal idiosyncracies but by and large they will not make the greatest of all human errors. As Stanley Diamond has put it: "After all, failure to recognize the true nature of the world in which we live—failure to recognize reality—is the cardinal human failure. And part of reality is one's own nature." □

FAR OFF IN THE ROCKIES

Game Plan for a Youth Conference

JOHN MATHEWS
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Estes Park, Colo.

When the Nixon Administration decided, with some misgivings, about two years ago that it had to follow the tradition begun by Theodore Roosevelt of holding every decade a White House Conference on Children and Youth, it made the further decision to break up the affair into two separate conferences. Last December in Washington, the children's conference unfolded for four hectic days, with rump plenary sessions being called by the minorities and then by Establishment social service organizations, which were angry because for the first time in decades they had been denied control of the event. After much tumult and talk, the children's conference came up with a list of generalities that are already getting shabby on the shelf.

Stephen Hess, the political writer, youth aide of the Eisenhower era, and now graying White House staffer, who was "entrusted by the President" to direct the conferences—as the press releases put it—demonstrated his skill at the children's conference. He managed to keep the minorities from walking out, deftly isolated the traditionally Democratic national social service organizations, and so structured the event that it produced sets of resolutions that would hardly threaten or embarrass the White House.

But the youth conference promised to be an entirely different matter. To plan it, Hess and his staff carefully picked a group of 100 adults and young people (14 to 24 years old), in general a credible blend of liberals, moderates and conservatives. With apparently no overt pressure, the site committee of this planning group decided last fall, by a vote of 10 to 9, that the conference should be held in an isolated, non-college setting, far from Washington. Hess and his staff then scoured the map and came up with a site that could not be easily crashed by ghetto or campus radicals: the YMCA camp of the Rockies, 8,000 feet high in the mountains, 5 miles from the resort town of Estes Park, Colo., 60 miles from Denver and 1,500 miles from the White House.

To insure, in Hess's words, that the conference would be "an honest cross section of American youth and not just college or white middle-class student activists," the director hit upon a brilliant and perfectly legitimate method for selecting delegates. He decided that the 1,000 youth delegates should reflect demographically the distribution of the total population in the 14-to-24 age group. Thus, college students were allocated only 210 of the 1,000 slots, or 20 per cent, slightly better than their national distribution of 15.6 per cent. High school youth comprised 35.4 per cent; out-of-school working youth—many of them college graduates—39.1 per cent, and youth in the military 4.5 per cent. Similarly, the liberal Northeast and West Coast were put in their place geographically. The bulk of the delegates came from the South, the Plains States and the Midwest. Minorities were intentionally overrepresented, getting 30 per cent of the total youth delegates. While the young people were thus picked scientifically, the 500 adults, chosen by the conference staff, were heavily weighted in favor of government, business and Establishment liberals.

On paper, at least, the youth delegation selection process seemed designed to demonstrate, as Steve Hess told the opening conference session, that "the youth population is not monolithic; that all youth are not cut from the same cloth; that you are rich in differences." More precisely, the conference seemed structured to show the nation that there is a silent majority among its youth.

At the outset, it looked as though the game plan might work. The delegates arrived on a brilliant springlike Sunday and walked about mesmerized by the thin air and the spectacular views of snow-capped, 12,000-foot peaks of the Continental Divide. At night, they were greeted by President Nixon's stand-in, Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. His rhetorical question, "Why are we here?," and his pledge that the President was listening to youth, were met with skeptical laughter. Most of the delegates responded warmly to a young businessman from Fresno who had just returned from Vietnam with a plea for peace from student groups and to a young film maker from Harpers Ferry, W. Va., who said, "I have only one question—Where is Dick and where is Spiro in this time when we need leaders?"

However, Hess also had his innings. A couple of young men in work shirts and jeans, members of Joint Effort—

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a dissident group critical of the conference organization—strode on stage and tried to pull the microphone from Hess. The director calmly asked for a chance to finish his remarks, then turned the rostrum over to the intruders, who made a fuzzy proposal for electing a representative group of delegates to manage the conference. Hess immediately took up the challenge and called for the vote. It produced a resounding chorus of "no's," and the apprentice radicals disappeared for the rest of the conference.

When delegates woke the next morning, after a generally cold, uncomfortable night in their musty Spartan cabins and lodges, springtime in the Rockies had suddenly turned into a driving snowstorm, the first of several that would eventually pile up a 2-foot cover at the camp. Conference officials rushed in borrowed U.S. Army parkas and boots for the young people, many of whom, like the young man from Hawaii in sandals and flowered shirt, had come unprepared for the last gasp of Western winter.

Despite the adversities, the ten issue-area task forces, each comprised of about 100 youth and fifty adult delegates, got down to work. Much of Monday was spent in torturous procedural hassles, which quickly discouraged many delegates. The Race and Minority Group Relations task force broke into an array of caucuses of blacks, Spanish-American, Asian-American, Indian, European-American, as well as two subgroups made up mostly of whites; non-ethnic caucus No. 1, subtitled the "caucus of human beings," and non-ethnic caucus No. 2, also known as "just plain folks."

Early in the proceedings, a Washington *Star* reporter obtained an internal communications memorandum addressed to Hess that laid out a scenario for "positive news coverage." The memo suggested that a 20-year-old Harvard University senior, who happened to be black, should be the daily press briefer, and that "as a precautionary measure aimed at preventing delegate disruption," a steering committee with guaranteed "minority representation," should be established. Members of the committee—eventually called the advisory group—should be ready to act as conference spokesmen, the memo said, in the event of disruptions. "This suggests to the press that the conference is being run by the delegates," the memo added.

By early Wednesday morning, after two full days of discussions, the task forces drew up their resolutions and recommendations, which under conference rules could be put to a vote or merely included in the final report. Task force actions were reported to a final general session in the camp's roller-skating rink Wednesday afternoon. For five hours, about 1,200 delegates witnessed a remarkable spectacle: youth in the front rows openly smoking pot as the drug task force made its report urging legalization; a young woman libertarian carrying on a continuous solo chorus denouncing liberal recommendations, and the black caucus chairman concluding his attack on the conference with the statement: "We say to the Administration, especially the President, that business is business and bullshit is bullshit."

With slightly more than half the youth delegates and only 123 of the 500 adults voting, the conference approved a list of anti-Administration and Left-of-center resolutions. The conference voted for a complete withdrawal from Vietnam by December 31 (the Hatfield-McGovern bill) and an immediate halt to bombing, ground and naval warfare and support; legalization of marijuana under government auspices, tolerance of "any sexual behavior" between consenting individuals; a call for the resignation of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover because of political surveillance activities, and abolition of the detention camp section of the Internal Security Act.

Factors, difficult for the conference game planners to anticipate, appeared to produce the non-silent-majority results. As one conference official put it, "The silent majority was here, but it was very silent." Although in the minority on the task forces, liberal-radical college students and liberal adults were more accustomed to the intellectual process of endless discussion and resolution writing and usually were the best informed. The radic-libs decisively dominated both high school students and conservatives, many of whom dropped out during the conference sessions. A task force dealing with ethics-values and culture typified the process.

Director Hess, apparently pleased with a pre-conference report of this EVC task force, which was a groovy, fervent and nonpolitical plea for an understanding and acceptance of youth culture, assigned to the group the job of writing a preamble to the entire conference report. Several of the more radical members of EVC, which also included such conservatives as Sen. William Brock, the Tennessee Republican, and Archbishop Philip Hannan of New Orleans, quickly realized the political opportunity of the preamble. A preamble drafting committee was formed under the leadership of James Kunen, author of *The Strawberry Statement,* a book about the 1968 Columbia University student take-over, and including a young radical from Boulder, a recently discharged liberal Pentagon naval intelligence officer and a conservative—who subsequently became a dropout or a pushout. Its radical first draft was later toned down by the full 150-member task force, but, despite revisions, the official preamble to the White House Conference on Youth speaks of the Constitution as a "racist and sexist" document, refers to political repression, chauvinism and the "genocide" of American Indians, and suggests the possibility of revolution.

At his concluding news conference, Director Hess made no attempt to backtrack on his earlier assertion that the conference was the most representative group of American young people ever assembled. He did point out, however, that most of the delegates "tended to be activists." Even though many of the youth delegates were Boy or Girl Scouts, Future Farmers, Homemakers or Businessmen of America, members of Junior Achievement or the Silent Majority Mobilization Committee, or the protégés of state committees on children and youth, they did seem to have a common bias against the war, the draft and repressive laws. No screening process was able to filter out what seems to be a pervasive feeling among today's young people of ennui and dissatisfaction with things as they are. Most task forces, however, did work out the political compromise of not directly attacking the President or his policies; instead they looked ahead to future alternatives. In all, the White House Conference on Youth ended up with slightly more than a "greening" of issues, but something less than a roasting of its absent host, the President. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Maybe Too Much Is Enough

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RICHARD F. KAUFMAN
Mr. Kaufman is on the staff of the Joint Economic Committee. He is the author of The War Profiteers *(Bobbs-Merrill).*

A memoir of Robert S. McNamara's term with the Department of Defense, *How Much is Enough* is also a concise primer of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), a method of gathering and evaluating information designed to take the pork barrel out of government spending. Further, and perhaps more important, it is an argument for strengthening the role of the Secretary of Defense vis-à-vis the armed services, so that the initiative for shifting military missions, eliminating or restraining glamorous weapons systems, and cutting back forces does not rest exclusively with the bureaucrats who stand to gain or lose by their decisions.

The Secretary of Defense, say Enthoven and Smith, two former members of McNamara's staff, needs to be in a position to shape the defense program because most major military issues transcend the parochial concerns of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Unless those issues are defined in terms of overall national policy, our military capabilities will not be balanced and coordinated. The services by themselves cannot be trusted to supply honest and accurate data or estimates from the field, about our own or opposing capabilities—or even about the status of weapons systems being procured. Left to their own devices they will not create the optimal "mix of forces." The function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to integrate the interdependent military parts. However, "If forced to make hard choices, the JCS tries to negotiate a compromise—one that often bears little relationship to the best mix of forces from a national or a military point of view." Therefore an independent agency within the Pentagon, directly responsible to the Secretary, was set up to serve as an analytical check against the services.

The Office of Systems Analysis, which Enthoven headed from 1965 to 1969 (Smith served as his Special Assistant), was that agency. It was embroiled in Congressional and bureaucratic controversy from the start, for it threatened the illusions of military expertise and legislative hardheadedness in the area of national security. With the help of its reports McNamara indeed made many of the "hard choices" that otherwise would not have been made. Gen. Curtis LeMay's beloved B-70 bomber and the Skybolt missile were dropped because they were bad bargains in terms of money costs. The Air Force and the Navy had to content themselves with modified versions of the same plane (the TFX, later called the F-111) in the interests of economy. The deployment of a full-scale ABM defense of the cities was opposed.

The bomber lobby, the missile lobby, and all the other interests in the military, Congress and the aerospace industry whose projects were turned down in the name of cost effectiveness, nursed their grudges. It took them the better part of a decade to get even, but when they did the joke was on McNamara and the "whiz kids" of the Office of Systems Analysis. The F-111, poorly fabricated by the contractors and loaded with junk by the military, has become a prototype of poor decision making. Inevitably, McNamara has taken the blame—somewhat unfairly, since General Dynamics, Grumman, the Air Force and the Navy have all had a share in promoting the fiasco. After eight years of intermittent hearings, the McClellan committee concluded that the program had been plagued by government mismanagement and conflicts of interest, sidestepping the questions of bad design and contractor inefficiency. Yet, despite the huge cost overruns, technical failures and schedule delays, the program itself was not canceled, and the contractors have hardly been criticized. Now, in addition to the F-111, there is the Navy's F-14 and the Air Force's F-15, both of which bear a strong resemblance to the F-111.

Prior to the big military buildup of 1965, McNamara and his technocrats were able to fend off the critics because the new policy of flexible response made more sense and was less frightening than the "massive retaliation" doctrine of John Foster Dulles which envisioned atomic war. And with the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 international tensions appeared to be easing. The systems-analysis approach led to the strengthening of both nuclear and conventional forces, and effected a number of economies. Each year in his testimony before Congress, McNamara could boast of the savings brought about by his management techniques. In 1964 the defense budget actually went down for the first time in many years, and it seemed that the military juggernaut had finally been mastered.

Once the United States escalated the war in Vietnam, the defense budget leaped forward from year to year by tens of billions of dollars. McNamara continued to tell Congress that his efforts were paying off but, in the face of rising total outlays and gross miscalculations of the costs of the war, claims that money was being saved were received with skepticism. When McNamara committed the final sin of wavering on the wisdom of the war, there could no longer be any hope for his official reputation or for the future of Systems Analysis. In 1968 Mr. Nixon made a campaign promise to "root out the whiz kids at the Pentagon," and a year later Rep. L. Mendel Rivers almost succeeded in abolishing the office. Under Defense Secretary Melvin Laird the Office of Systems Analysis has lost its essential functions, and its right to put forward independent proposals about defense programs has returned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services.

McNamara cannot escape blame for complicity in the war itself. It is hard to understand how so essentially decent and intelligent a man could be persuaded to support the brutal Asian policies pursued by the past three Presidents. Enthoven and Smith do not address the question. They evade it: "The Systems Analysis office played no policy role in the decision to go into Vietnam, in the decision to bomb North Vietnam, in the determination of targets to be bombed, in the timing of bombing pauses, or in the development of strategy or tactics." No doubt the technocrats are entitled to their disclaimers, although we might question the value of an analytical operation that fails to grapple with the most important issues. And yet the authors come close to dissidence when they write that "systematic analysis and the application of program-budgeting techniques might have helped forestall the over-Americanization of the war, the pervasive optimism of official statements on how well we were doing, and *the twisted priorities that developed in the expendi-*

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tures of billions of dollars on various war programs." (Emphasis added.)

According to the authors, Systems Analysis was finally called upon to study a number of questions relating directly to Vietnamese policy, and one of these was the policy of attrition. The theory was that the United States might inflict so many casualties that the enemy would be forced to withdraw. From this came the obsession with the "body count." In the field, there was double-counting, the counting of civilian bystanders, the counting of porters, the counting of graves, and plain exaggeration. Typically, a company commander would report so many enemy killed. The figure would be raised at the battalion level and raised again at the brigade level. For good measure, additional numbers were thrown in for artillery and air support. After all, everyone was entitled to a share of the "kill." According to Enthoven and Smith, "Padded claims kept everyone happy. . . ."

In this general context the Office of Systems Analysis estimated that North Vietnam could replace 200,000 losses annually—a figure that had never been approached during the bloodiest period of the war. "The United States could not hope to win a war of attrition within any reasonable period of years even [if] the enemy [were] willing to fight on a massive scale." The strategy of attrition had been revealed as a sham supported by a flow of phony numbers from the U.S. military command in Vietnam. The disclosure that "noncombat" deaths in 1970 rose sharply over 1966 (troop strength was about the same in those years) suggests that the body count deception might now be employed to understate the number of Americans killed in combat.

In another study, the bombing of North Vietnam was shown to be ineffective in accomplishing any of its stated objectives. That strategy was designed to reduce the flow of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam, but the flow increased in the face of steadily intensified bombing. Enemy activity in the South itself did not decline as a result of the bombing of the North; it increased to nine times what it had been before. The damage to North Vietnam from the destruction of facilities and the drop in economic production was estimated at $600 million from 1965 to 1968, but that amount was more than offset by the $2 billion in foreign aid received by North Vietnam during the same period. Meanwhile, the United States lost about $6 billion just in destroyed aircraft.

Why weren't similar analyses made before, the authors ask with respect to body counts. On what other issues, we might ask, have the military distorted the facts? The list in this book alone is very long. Much of our support of NATO, for example, was for many years based on false estimates of U.S. and allied military strength, and exaggerated notions of Soviet strength. One of the most outrageous examples was the conclusion that NATO's conventional forces were hopelessly outnumbered by the Russians and the Warsaw Pact nations—which served to justify the policy of massive retaliation and the deployment of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons throughout Western Europe.

In reality, our military intelligence has consistently miscounted the number of Soviet combat-ready units. In addition, the United States and Soviet divisions are not equal: a fully mobilized U.S. division has about three times the number of men as its Soviet counterpart, and proportionally greater firepower. The claims that NATO was outnumbered three to one by Soviet tactical aircraft and was being outspent by the Warsaw Pact nations have also proved untrue. Our assessment of Soviet aircraft had somehow included training as well as combat units and had omitted from the U.S. inventory aircraft located outside of Europe which could be redeployed for NATO if necessary. And NATO's defense outlays in 1968 were 50 per cent greater than those of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Enthoven and Smith have laid out as damning a bill of particulars about military excesses as has been drawn since defense spending became a serious subject for public debate approximately three years ago. Coming from two sources deep within the system (Enthoven left the Pentagon to become a vice president at Litton, one of the nation's largest aerospace contractors; Smith is now director of Henry Kissinger's program analysis staff), their criticism of military intelligence and military judgment must be taken seriously.

Not surprisingly, there are some gaps in the book. The presentations of two of the most controversial weapons programs of the McNamara era, the F-111 and the C-5A cargo plane, are evasive and incomplete. In the F-111 case it is true that McNamara was compromised to some extent by decisions and recommendations made in the previous administration. In a sense, the F-111 was his Bay of Pigs. But once the evidence was in that the program would be a continuing disaster, he could and should have taken corrective action. And describing the cost overruns of the C-5A as "an honest mistake," seems disingenuous. There was little honesty in the intentional concealment of the overruns from Congress and the public, or in the reprisals directed against the Air Force official who first testified about them and was fired. Even Enthoven and Smith concede that the repricing provision, which makes the government legally liable for much if not most of the overruns, was slipped into the contract in violation of the spirit of that specific kind of contract, and without the knowledge of the Secretary of Defense. The assertion that airlift costs less with the C-5A than with any other aircraft is also less than candid. When costs of buying C-5As are added to operating costs they are higher than with other aircraft. The statement that cost increases have been accompanied by "a commensurate increase in effectiveness" is in error. Performance standards for the C-5A have been degraded and the planes that have been delivered to the Air Force have so many deficiencies that they are unable to perform their tactical mission.

Curiously, the authors never answer their own question, How much is enough? Nowhere in the book is the defense budget discussed with specific reference to the dollars spent in any given year. They offer more than a hint that military spending is excessive, but we are not told by how much. Others have attempted to demonstrate the feasibility and desirability of reducing the defense budget from the present level of about $75 billion to as low as $35 billion without jeopardizing national security. On this critical matter the authors do not comment.

They recommend better Congressional debate "and more informed participation by the interested public." They urge an improvement in the quality of information presented to the Secretary of Defense, as well as to the Congress and the President. They want to impose financial restrictions on the services so that they will be forced to face the "hard choices." And they would like to see an annual review by the Pentagon and the White House of the total federal budget, so that the defense program can be examined in relation to foreign policy and domestic needs.

The trouble with these recommendations, and I have made some of them myself, is that they can mean everything or nothing. It's difficult to oppose improving the decision-making process—but one can improve that process all the way to a militarized society. In other words, such improvements can be useful only if they arise from a conviction that the existing process is corrupt. If we mean to promote national security we must reduce the defense budget sharply. It is not clear to me whether or not Enthoven and Smith share that conviction. □

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Talking Union

LABOR RADICAL: From the Wobblies to CIO. *By Len De Caux. Beacon Press. 557 pp. $15.*

LEO FENSTER

Mr. Fenster, an auto worker by trade, was for twenty-six years an officer of the UAW, during which time he handled in-shop grievances and worked out agreements at the General Motors plant in Cleveland.

When John L. Lewis dropped Big Bill Hutcheson, president of the Carpenter's Union, with one punch at the 1935 convention of the American Federation of Labor, it may have been the most significant right cross in history. It was a blow struck for tens of millions of unorganized workers in the country's basic industries. Lewis' confrontation with Big Bill, the foe of industrial organization, was spontaneous, but his sense of timing must have told him that a good punch would be productive as well as dramatic. It was. It said, as nothing else could, that the battle to organize the unorganized was for real. A short five years later, Lewis resigned from the presidency of the CIO. Looking back, it is evident that he sensed that the CIO had already made its basic contribution and had begun to decline. The "irreverent pragmatist" did not propose to preside over its dissolution.

For twelve years, from 1935 to 1947, Len De Caux was the public relations director of this CIO. His book is essentially these two stories: the tale of the organization's rise, and the tale of its decline. The short, ascendant arc of the CIO's twenty-year life should not mislead anyone, however, as to its significance. February 11, 1937, when the great General Motors Corporation was compelled to sign a contract with its CIO auto workers, was a turning point in the history of our country. Sick in bed, or feigning sickness, hovered over by the corporation's bargaining team importuning him for a one-month rather than a six-month contract, Lewis mumbled that it would have to be six months and turned his back. That was it. GM could not argue with that turned back, and history did not choose to.

Within a few months, millions of workers had been organized, thousands of contracts had been signed—and not meaningless "sweetheart" contracts, but substantial agreements that altered the life of the worker, giving him a measure of genuine liberation within the shop and outside it. Grievance procedures and seniority provisions were incorporated in these contracts to provide job security. A new concept of the responsibility of employer and government to provide for the worker's needs out of the product of the worker's labor became the accepted standard: Social Security, retirement pensions, sick pay, unemployment compensation, death benefits, maternity benefits, health care, partially guaranteed wages, paid vacations, etc.

But perhaps the greatest change was the acceptance of the principle that wages were to be arrived at by bargaining, and were not to go up or down at the whim of the boss or even at the vagaries of the economy. Nixon and his economists did not understand that simple fact when they set out to bring about deflation by increasing unemployment. Before the struggles of the CIO, this had been the classical way. Had it not worked during the depression, when unemployment and sharp price declines were twin phenomena? But that was when a weak and unaggressive American Federation of Labor could not or would not stop wage declines, and price declines could follow after. But by 1969 and 1970, the pattern was different. Unemployment meant a restricted market, lower per-capita production measured against overall cost, and therefore a higher cost per piece. Prices rose. However, instead of accepting wage cuts, labor demanded increases. Organizationally powerful, moreover, it could enforce its demands. The Nixon attempt to check inflation with an antiquated formula failed, and we had the anomaly of declining employment and rising prices. One way of viewing the revolution accomplished by organized labor is that it has prevented the burden of recession from being loaded entirely onto the backs of the workers.

After Lewis resigned, and before, during and after the Second World War, there were redbaiting and factional turmoil within the CIO. De Caux paints the whole dismal picture in almost 200 pages of detail and polemics. With the coming of the cold war, the right wing used its obvious advantages to break apart the fabric of the CIO. It was to have been only a corrective operation; it turned out to be emasculation.

Len De Caux lets the story end there, for he was not involved in what was to come. Reuther took over after Philip Murray died and failed to make any creative innovations. He led the CIO back into the AFL, hoping to take over from an aged and arthritic Meany. But Meany lived on, the CIO melted away, and Reuther and his UAW walked out alone. He arranged a marriage of convenience with the Teamsters, but it has gone unconsummated. At a time when another disjointed period in American history is calling for a militant new program on labor's part, none is available. Perhaps a Leonard Woodcock, an Emil Mazey, a young Paul Schrade might frame such a program. It is more likely to come from working-class youngsters now in the wings.

The Right within the labor movement now lives with its sins, unrepentant but unfulfilled. What about the Left—the Left in general and the Communist Left? Can it escape all criticism for labor's emasculation? De Caux describes himself as a radical; he undoubtedly uses the word in its basic sense, one who seeks to get to the root of problems. He was never organizationally a member of the Communist Party of the United States. He is a little gingerly, however, in his criticism of the Communists and the Left; it is often implied, seldom explicit. Yet the Left made grave errors. Its first was in 1939 when it shifted from a collective security to a no-war position because of the German-Soviet pact. Stalin might have had compelling reasons to negotiate the pact. But German-Soviet pact or not, the American people had

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

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

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compelling reasons to fear the Axis and to work for its defeat. There was nothing in the German-Soviet pact that made it impermissible to continue the fight against Hitler. On the contrary, it made the fight that much more essential. The Left of that day confused tactics with strategy, and embarrassed itself and its friends.

In the postwar period, the Left decided to brave the fight. It never had the remotest chance of winning; the American people had accepted Truman's cold-war policies. Nevertheless, had the Left been more ably led, the losses in terms of shattered morale and wasted efforts on the part of its militants in the CIO might have been greatly reduced. One observes today the far greater skill of the North Vietnamese-Vietcong military and political maneuvering. The surviving Left of the old CIO must understand that it exhibited no such skill and thus helped to bring about the dissolution of an important movement.

There are weaknesses in De Caux's book. It is overlong, mainly because it is too wordy and much too detailed in its treatment of the redbaiting theme. A good deal could have been excised here without injuring the quality of the polemic. Moreover, *Labor Radical* is jumpy in its chronology. This is no obstacle to the initiate who lived through the historical period he treats, but it does present problems to the latecomer and the newcomer to whom this book must be especially enlightening. Now that the era of the CIO can be studied in perspective, a number of books have been and will be published on that subject. This one can be expected to tower over most of them. It is comprehensive, it is written within the movement it deals with, and the author was able to observe with detachment in the midst of passionate participation. *Labor Radical* should be studied by the new breed of militant workers in the shops who quite rightly deride "history" when it is appealed to only to blunt their militancy, but who must be steeped in authentic history nevertheless if they are to understand who they are and what choices are open to them. It should be studied by the divided middle class, by professionals, liberals, clergy, pacifists, who must understand the processes of social change if their attempts at reform are to succeed. It should be studied by black militants for a better understanding of how the ebb and flow of union politics affects their welfare.

In short, De Caux's account will be indispensable to the growing number who are eager to change this country's priorities, and can do so only if they understand the lessons of the past, including the role of labor and the necessity for a permanent organization if each new popular movement is not to expend its energy uselessly. □


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Poet of Brooklyn, Ulster & Paris

A CHOSEN LIGHT. *By John Montague. The Swallow Press. 71 pp. $5.*

M. L. ROSENTHAL

Mr. Rosenthal is a teacher, critic and poet. His latest book is Beyond Power: New Poems *(Oxford).*

The Irish poet John Montague is one of the most interesting now writing in English. He tells a story, paints a picture, evokes an atmosphere, suggests the complexities and torments of adult love and marriage—all in the most direct, concrete, involving way. The poems come out of a deeply human speaking personality for whom language and reality are more than just a source of a plastic design of nuances. Montague does have a highly developed sense of the craft; he is a real poet, who works at his desk and drinks of the tradition. But he brings all his engagement with his art directly to bear on the world of our common life, as Frost and Williams so often did, and thus makes immediate contact with his readers. He thinks and talks like a grown-up man, and that fact alone makes him better literary company than most of his poetic contemporaries.

The poems of *A Chosen Light* fall naturally into four large groups. The first ones we encounter, and with some exceptions the most striking, have to do with love. More particularly, they deal with love in a marriage that, it is suggested, has suffered a grievous, unnamed wound and yet survives with a unique meaning and purity. The group includes at least five truly memorable pieces, chief among them "All Legendary Obstacles," a poem about the troubled reunion of lovers after long separation. It is closely rivaled by "That Room," about the traumatic discovery by husband and wife of some disastrous reality, and by "The Trout," literally about the sensation of trapping a trout with one's bare hands but with overtones of sexual and psychological intensity that keep reverberating in the mind. I would add, as well, the dedicatory poem, whose protagonists find their house symbolically disappearing—first the roof, then the walls, and finally the floor under them; and "A Private Reason," a further development of the theme of "All Legendary Obstacles." Montague has a classic lyric gift. Lines like "Kissing, still unable to speak," "Side by side on the narrow bed," "Rarely in a lifetime comes such news," and "To this day I can/ Taste his terror on my hands" are not rare in his work.

A second grouping has to do with rural Ulster. This is not quite "his native Ulster" (as the book jacket has it); Montague was born in Brooklyn, where his father, as one of the most touching poems, "The Cage," tells us, worked in a subway change booth. Ulster was nevertheless the family base. The poet lived there many years and does indeed write of it with a native ground sense both loving and harsh. Local realities of landscape, personality and indigenous experience are sharply sketched in with a bitter yet tender truthfulness reminiscent of the older Irish master poet Austin Clarke. Unlike Clarke, though, Montague has lived much of his adult life away from Ireland, mostly in Paris. His poems have a distancing and a nostalgia peculiar to this situation and not uncharacteristic of much modern Irish writing that

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grows out of the self-exiling of many Irish writers. (In a group of poems not yet published in this country, Montague has written powerfully of Irish political history and the current struggles in Ulster from the same intimately concerned yet "objective" standpoint.)

Montague's Parisian experience constitutes the center of the book's third section. Although this section brings his political awareness, Irish interests and marital situation into play again, its true concern lies in his situation as an artist of this moment. The brief title sequence moves into this focus of sensibility with a special accuracy and beauty. First we see the night view from the door of his atelier, where he can "smell the earth of the garden" and range all the impressions of that tiny, unluxurious Eden against the lights and dark outlines of working-class Paris in the vicinity. Then, in imagination, he follows one rigorous "voyager," a "strict master" with his "fastidious mask," as he moves sustaining his disciplined inner aesthetic among the children and lovers in the Luxembourg Gardens and "weathers to how man is." Finally, we have a poem anchored in the marvelous image of the radiometers in rue Jacob, symbolic "not of help, but of neutral energy" that is forever "casting its pale light/ Over unhappiness." The effect of this image is to conjure up the peculiarly impersonal empathy that life demands of the poet. The final group of poems ranges among primal and broadly symbolic motifs that place this guiding sensibility in the widest possible context. With this book John Montague reinforces his position among the humanly genuine poets now writing. □

At War With Ourselves

AT WAR WITH ASIA: Essays on Indochina. *By Noam Chomsky. Pantheon Books. 313 pp. $7.95.*

CHARLES LAM MARKMANN
Mr. Markmann, a frequent contributor, is a journalist, critic, novelist and translator. His latest book, The Noblest Cry *(St. Martin's Press), is a history of the American Civil Liberties Union.*

Townsend Hoopes was Under Secretary of the Air Force during the latter part of the Johnson administration, and of him Noam Chomsky says, without irony: "I want to stress that Hoopes's is one of the most humane and enlightened voices to be heard within the mainstream of American opinion today, surely among those who have had any significant role in the formation and implementation of policy. For this reason, his views are important and deserve careful consideration."

And it is from Hoopes's book, *The Limits of Intervention,* published after he had left government service, that Chomsky, in the final section, "On War Crimes," of his own new book, quotes his passage:

> We believe the enemy can be forced to be "reasonable," i.e., to compromise or even capitulate, because we assume he wants to avoid pain, death, and material destruction. We assume that if these are inflicted on him with increasing severity, then at some point in the process he will want to stop the suffering. Ours is a plausible strategy—for those who are rich, who love life and fear pain. But happiness, wealth, and power are expectations that constitute a dimension far beyond the experience, and probably beyond the emotional comprehension, of the Asian poor.

Certainly such a way of thinking is as cruel and callous as Chomsky says it is. And certainly it deserves the label of "cryptoracism" created by James Thomson, formerly an East Asian specialist for the State Department and the White House, in an article in *The Atlantic Monthly* for April 1968, from which Chomsky quotes a passage that ends: "Would we have pursued quite such policies—and quite such military tactics—if the Vietnamese were white?"

It is of course as impossible to answer Thomson's question categorically as it would be for Hoopes to prove that poor Asians do not love life or comprehend happiness. Yet Chomsky's juxtaposition of the quotations is anything but unfair; it is in a sense a synthesis of much—possibly most—of what underlies the American majority's apathy to the war in Asia.

It is just this majority, in all probability, that will never see or even hear of Chomsky's newest book and that most needs it; though I cannot help wondering if anything could penetrate the complacency of most of our compatriots. It is more than forty years since Kurt Tucholsky (who shortly thereafter committed suicide in exile) wrote of the good burghers of Germany that their whole philosophy of life could be epitomized in one sentence: "I don't give a damn about

Cry from the Cotton

The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union and the New Deal

by DONALD H. GRUBBS

Introduction by DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, JR.



Before its demise in the mid-forties, the STFU learned many lessons of value to those concerned with social reform. Founded in Arkansas in 1934, the union was based on Southern fundamentalist and populist traditions and won the popular support of both black and white workers—and in the process showed that racism can be overcome in the pursuit of common goals. Also by bringing the plight of the sharecroppers to national attention the STFU inspired the formation of the New Deal's Farm Security Administration.

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politics as long as business is good." Are we so different?

Noam Chomsky—and many more of us—would like to think so, but he finds it at times difficult. In this collection of six long papers on the war in Southeast Asia, four of which appeared in *The New York Review of Books* (the final piece, "On War Crimes," is the expansion of his introduction to the forthcoming second edition of *Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal*), Chomsky cites a mass of documentation available in establishment publications, as well as much other evidence that appeared in less widely circulated newspapers and magazines. His sources are The Associated Press and United Press International, whose services are subscribed to by the overwhelming majority of American daily newspapers of any substance; *The New York Times*, which, in addition to its own respectable circulation, supplies its correspondents' dispatches to a great many newspapers throughout the country; *The Washington Post*, the Boston *Globe* and ABC and CBS News—to say nothing of the Defense Department, the State Department, and other government voices that can be heard by anyone interested enough to listen. Even in the camouflaged versions of truth that many of these sources have on occasion dispensed, it is impossible not to see verification of the outrages against humanity and common decency reported by such less widely known (in America) publications as the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *Le Monde*, and the *New Statesman*, on all of which Chomsky draws as well. (Unfortunately his book contains no organized bibliography; sources are identified in footnotes only.)

Even to anyone who has read only the respectable press, so-called, much of the information in this book has a familiar ring, the more so since the Song My atrocity has now and again incited press and broadcasters to repeat some of their earlier and more horrendous accounts. More specialized observers will find still less that is new because they will have read either Chomsky's more recondite sources or his original *New York Review* essays that, with some revision, constitute four of the book's chapters—and that exemplify journalism at its best. What is of particular value here, whether as revelation to the first-time reader or as reminder to the re-reader, is Chomsky's meticulous historical analysis.

His first book on this subject, *American Power and the New Mandarins*, was impressive in its scholarly integrity, and the same virtue stands out in *At War With Asia*. Whether he is discussing last spring's invasion of Cambodia or the French occupation of Vietnam before Dienbienphu, Chomsky never leaves the reader in the slightest doubt as to the reliability of the sources on which he bases what he has to say. He is no more afraid to give devils their due than to exhort angels to scour the tarnish off their halos.

"Indochina and the American Crisis," the first section of the book, is completely new material. Here Chomsky not only examines the factors that impelled the United States to intervene in Southeast Asia in the first place but also establishes —though the better word would probably be "confirms"—the inseparability of this intervention from our conduct in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and the "liberated" Pacific areas since 1945. Never strident, never doctrinaire, never content to rely on insinuation or probability, he provides documentation from official government and Congressional sources, as well as from more suspect—because Left or foreign—authorities, to demonstrate our frank concern with the maintenance of the *status quo* of the industrialist world and its colonial properties.

The moralist justification for imperialism—ours or anyone else's—is too trite for repetition or even, one would think, condemnation; though one cannot deny sincerity to all its apologists on their various grounds (salvation of the soul, preservation of human liberties, establishment of workers' paradises). What rightly stirs Chomsky's moral anger—which is not seldom made the more effective by a deadly irony—is the immoralism of the moralists as well as of the amoralists.

Chomsky reminds us that the American crisis—which is "a world crisis, given American power"—is "the fundamental incompatibility of democracy and capitalism, particularly in its modern centralized form." Our central institutions, he says, are our commercial, financial, and industrial systems and these "are in law and in principle excluded from public control or participation." These institutions, he continues, require for survival "production for war with the ideological mobilization of the population . . . [and] the paranoid fears that must be induced if the system is to be viable."

The peoples of Indochina, Chomsky asserts, have been the victims of this crisis for twenty years. He concedes the existence of material interests that initially motivated American intervention there, but he points out that today "influential segments of the American corporate elite itself are urging that this venture be 'liquidated,' as bad business, if for no other reason." He then warns that the crusade against communism has taken such deep root in this country that it cannot be turned off by fiat even when it would be clearly desirable economically to cut our losses. (What no one has ever done—what very possibly, in the present state of man's knowledge, no one can do—is the kind of study that would show us why and how such collective and, as it were, manufactured

PEACE PROSPECT

Too many people scribbling on each others' tongues,
gagging the cities.
The politics of the body is muddled by nations.
Sexuality is a force confused, unrealized, and wasted.
Human thoughts churn up recipes for deadly steel.
I sleep awhile and the marrow of painful earth is played out.
I have a pleasant dream of a land
inhabited only by bright animals
who refuse fire
and eat nothing but leaves.

I count the people I have tried to touch
and my hands melt sand into glass.
There is no chance between us for a fine love.
We can't manufacture food like vegetation
standing in the light.
Photosynthesis is the trees making love with the sun.

A vague intuition blossoms in my stomach.
We are a mind-ridden race and incompatible with Earth.
A better race will come.
I feel bright animals waiting in my genes for the right moment.

Daniela Gioseffi

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paranoia can dominate nations and cultures for such lengthy periods.)

The main body of Chomsky's book—the four *New York Review* pieces: "After Pinkville," "Cambodia," "Laos," and "North Vietnam"—seem basically to provide the abounding evidence in support of the thesis stated in the first section and restated and elaborated in the last: that the American crisis threatens imminently to destroy the world and, more important still, that it is a crisis of good and evil, however old-fashioned such notions may be. As a whole, *At War With Asia* has assembled massive intellectual, moral and factual support for those who believe with its author that three specific tasks are urgent:

(*1*) To bring the Vietnamese controversy down to its real issue: whether the United States should be involved at all in Indochina's internal affairs.

(*2*) To understand and explain with clarity what is really happening there.

(*3*) "To work incessantly to bring home to hawks and doves alike that the American people will not stay the course, that the society will become ungovernable if the American war in Indochina continues or expands."

Unfortunately—and I am sure Chomsky would not take exception—it will not be enough to evacuate Indochina only. For these three tasks apply not only to that country but to every area in which the United States has asserted its divine moral right. □

Red Sky at Morning

WEATHERMAN. *Edited by Harold Jacobs. Ramparts Press. 519 pp. Paper $3.45.*

RUSSELL NEUFELD
Mr. Neufeld, a former member of Weatherman, teaches at Goddard College, Vermont.

A revolution may be regarded as an attempt to realize the future through a concerted struggle to break the chains which bind us to the past. Those chains are represented, in our time, by the government's repressive forces—in Indochina, the ghetto, the hip community; its bureaucracies, which are unable and unwilling to meet even the minimal needs of black and Latin people; and its schools and prisons which defend the traditional values of property and punish all who challenge those values. They are also represented by the social forms within which most of us must function to survive: the family, the army, our jobs. Perhaps the most important obstacle to realizing our humanity, however, is our own internalization of such oppressive values as competitiveness, racism and male chauvinism. These attitudes are most dangerous to any liberation struggle because they insure that the evils and errors of the past will color the future as well.

Weatherman has been the organization of the white Left in this country which has tried the hardest to bring about revolution. It has confronted, although not always successfully, the obstacles to the struggle for liberation. Given this understanding of what revolution and Weatherman are about, Harold Jacobs' book is narrow and unsatisfactory. This is not to say, however, that it is without value within the limits it sets for itself. Arranged chronologically, the material in *Weatherman* consists of most of the significant papers, leaflets and articles produced by the organization itself; a collection of critical essays by some of Weatherman's best known friends and enemies on the Left; and Harold Jacobs' analysis of Weatherman and revolutionary strategy, which may be found in the introductory paragraphs to the various sections.

Jacobs' introductions should have served to tie the book together by providing a perspective on the other material, if only by virtue of hindsight. Instead, Jacobs approaches each article as if to do battle with its author. His arguments, in the main, are either rhetorical and sterile, or overly intellectual and sterile. Indeed, most of the debate within the movement itself, as the selections in the book more than adequately demonstrate, is similarly afflicted. Only the original manifesto, *"You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows,"* and some of the later statements by individuals and the underground avoid these pitfalls.

As for the critics of Weatherman, very few rise above name-calling. The notable exceptions are Andrew Kopkind and J. Kirk Sale. Possibly because both of these writers are primarily journalists, rather than polemicists, they tried to understand what was happening in Weatherman, and did not simply praise or condemn. Kopkind has three articles in the collection, each of which was written after a significant event in the evolution of the organization (i.e., the June 1969 SDS convention, the October 1969 Days of Rage in Chicago, and the March 1970 New York town-house explosion). All three articles are sympathetic, but are sufficiently detached and sufficiently attentive to the historical context, to afford a reasonable understanding of his subject. Sale's piece on Ted Gold does not argue the pros and cons of bombing but rather tries to trace the political development of one of the three persons killed in the town-house explosion. His article helps the reader understand why Ted Gold wound up in the townhouse.

This kind of understanding is totally lacking in Jacobs' commentaries, as it is in the articles by James Weinstein, David Horowitz andd Michael Lerner. One of the Weatherman leaders once said that "the Revolutionary Youth Movement is not a political position; it is a social reality." The authors just cited, including Jacobs, have no understanding of how the American empire produced its Weatherchildren. To them Weatherman is either a foreign ideology (Horowitz and Weinstein) or an incorrect political position (Lerner and Jacobs). After ten years of war in Indochina, during which many good people tried very hard to end that war through peaceful means, and after an equally long era of civil rights and black liberation struggles, the results of which are anything but justice for black people, anyone with his eyes open should have been able to predict the emergence of Weatherman as a logical response to American oppression. The members of Weatherman clearly felt the necessity of a militant movement for change. In August of 1969 they wrote:

> Look at it: America, 1969: The war goes on despite the jive double-talk

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about troop withdrawals and peace talks. Black people continue to be murdered by agents of the fat cats who run this country, if not in one way, then in another: by the pigs or the courts, by the boss or the welfare department . . . and young people all over the country go to prisons that are called schools, are trained for jobs that don't exist or serve no one's real interest but the boss's, and, to top it all off, get told that Vietnam is the place to defend their "freedom." None of this is very new. The cities have been falling apart, the schools have been bullshit, the jobs have been rotten and unfulfilling for a long time.

What's new is that today not quite so many people are confused, and a lot more people are angry. . . .

An unavoidable difficulty in the preparation of any book of instant history is that it soon becomes outdated. Many of the political positions which the editor assumed were Weatherman's at the time of his writing had already been analyzed, disavowed and discarded publicly by the underground prior to publication of the book. Particularly disappointing is the omission of the letter, "New Morning, Changing Weather," which Bernadine Dohrn sent to the movement several months ago. In it she analyzed the inadequacies of the "military line" of Weatherman which led to the town-house explosion, and she put forth some ideas for a broader concept of revolution. □

THE ALBUQUERQUE GRAVEYARD

It would be easier
to bury our dead
at the corner lot.
No need to wake
before sunrise,
take three buses,
walk two blocks,
search at the rear
of the cemetery,
to come upon the familiar names
with wilted flowers and patience.
But now I am here again.
After so many years
of coming here,
passing the sealed mausoleums,
the pretentious brooks and springs,
the white, sturdy limestone crosses,
the pattern of the place is clear to me.
I am going back
to the Black limbo,
an unwritten history
of our own tensions.
The dead lie here
in a hierarchy of small defeats.
I can almost see the leaders smile,
ashamed now of standing
at the head of those
who lie tangled
at the edge of the cemetery
still ready to curse and rage
as I do.
Here, I stop by the imitative cross
of one who stocked his parlor
with pictures of Robeson,
and would boom down the days,
dreaming of Othello's robes.
I say he never bothered me,
and forgive his frightened singing.
Here, I stop by the simple mound
of a woman who taught me
spelling on the sly,
parsing my tongue
to make me fit for her own dreams.
I could go on all day,
unhappily recognizing small heroes,
discontent with finding them here,
reproaches to my own failings.
Uneasy, I search the names
and simple mounds I call my own,
abruptly drop my wilted flowers,
and turn for home.

Jay Wright

DANCE

NANCY GOLDNER

Eliot Feld is one of the few choreographers who can assimilate the ballets of others and produce his own unique work. The mark of the model is just as apparent as Feld's mark, and it is precisely for this fact that Feld is so remarkable. He can use fully the ideas of another without becoming imprisoned or overwhelmed by them. He can do so, probably, because he does use ideas, or a set of images, that lie underneath and run through particular steps, and structural devices that might shape movement but are not movements in themselves. You will never see quoted phrases and rarely paraphrases in Feld's ballets; they will never look like something you have seen, but they might remind you of something. And that recollection only enriches the Feld work. To practice peaceful—in Feld's work, dynamic—coexistence, one must possess a fortress of style and self-identity. Feld has them.

Romance—one of three new ballets that Feld's American Ballet Company performed during a three-week engagement through May 9 at the Brooklyn Academy of Music—can be defined as Antony Tudor's *Lilac Garden* stripped to the bone. The plot is gone, but the situation remains. *Lilac Garden* occurs at a heightened time, the moments before Caroline is to be married. Attending the pre-nuptial party are Caroline; her groom, whom she does not love; her lover, and the groom's ex(?)-mistress. Amid the festivities of the party the four mismatched lovers exchange fleeting glances, have split-second confrontations, lapse into true feeling, bid final farewells, and generally try none too successfully to prepare themselves for the wedding. The fact that an irrevocable event will take place makes time precious, and there is an unrelenting urgency about the ballet.

The question of how Tudor achieves *Lilac Garden*'s tension and understated passion is quite a different matter. He does it through the device of tableau and a particular use of the music. Feld realized that these factors give *Lilac Garden* its potency, while the plot, exciting and appealingly intricate though it is, is a means of transportation to the destination.

In *Romance* four couples spend an evening in a placeless place at a timeless time. They dance to Brahms piano music; the piano is on stage. There are several benches, where the couples occasionally sit to watch others or to talk. Soon after the curtain, the eight people arrange themselves around the dancing area as if to begin a group dance. But suddenly all movement stops. The audience sees nothing but their arrangement. A second later one notes that, though the eight people are paired off, each one is looking at someone across the room. Not one couple is looking at each other.

While the dancers are motionless, the music plays on. If one were to time the beat by a metronome one would find that the pianist is playing no faster; nor is he playing louder or with what one might call more intensity. Yet the dancers' silence—their stillness—makes it seem as though Brahms were surging ahead. In this incredibly suggestive and tension-producing contrast, the dancers seem like the spoken word, while the music becomes their thoughts, tumbling over one another at immeasurable speed and bellyful of desire for unnamed things.

And so as the dancers pose, the position of their heads being the only indication that things are not quite as they seem, unwritten stories leap into being. We wait for their realization—pictures of chaos spreading across the stage come into mind—but no, the dancers begin to dance. The undercurrents remain under. In this way another tension settles in between what is underneath and the decorum demanded by dancing. This of tableau and its relationship to the mus

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get to the heart of *Lilac Garden* by extracting its intrinsic drama from the particulars of time, event and character.

Having whipped the *Lilac Garden* flag into *Romance* so accurately and so early, Feld then creates a variation on it for the rest of the ballet. He does not use the tableau proper again, and he is not interested in presenting the tangled lovers as succinctly or intensely as Tudor does. But the positional relationship between the dancers does remain the organizational tool. Where the dancers are is more important than what they are doing. And they continue to dance "behind" or more slowly than the music, so that all through *Romance* one feels the tension of an insistent, persistent imagination playing in front of and inside overt action, which is limited and restricted.

Each dance of *Romance* is an artful maneuver by which partners are exchanged or cast aside. Sometimes the exchange is done by glance. A woman is twirled by her partner and then bends backward as though in a swoon. Without fail, a man dancing on the other side of the stage falls into her line of upside-down vision. Meanwhile, her partner looks at the woman across the floor while he supports the swooning body. Another couple finish their little duet standing back to back; indeed, couples stand back to back as often as not. Their hands touch, perhaps, but their bodies slightly pull toward another. Sometimes these incidents happen in passing or during "intermission" seconds between dances. We might not notice them were they not happening again and again and simultaneously at various parts of the stage.

Other dances, however, are explicitly designed to be physical, and emotional, mazes. Two couples, for example, link hands and turn and twist themselves around each other so that they may glance at and graze shoulders with "the other." Bodies are strained and contact is only brief, for the group is constantly rearranging itself for bodily comfort and vacillating between desired objects. It is essentially experimental in nature; the only constant is that each person is discontent. Another construction of Feld's is to line up four people across the stage. Normally this makes two couples. But in *Romance* the two in the center dance while the outside two are left partnerless, nudged out of the dance. Again, it is a dance of restless change and experimentation as the center couple keeps changing.

As the ballet progresses, placement becomes slightly more dramatic. Little vignettes, rather than abstract expressions of a general condition, emerge. In one such story two men claim the same woman. Genuine competition is aroused, while the outcast woman makes her claim upon the philandering husband. (This is the only dance where one may use such terms as "husband" and "wife" and where the situation narrows into a story, so that we may describe action as specific as "philandering.") The story ends with the two men facing the woman, their arms resting on her. The wife clings to her husband's back, her arms around his neck and her head nestled sideways on his shoulder, at once wounded by him and protective of him. For all the poignancy of that dance, however, it is the more generalized arrangements, the abstract *Lilac Garden*, that makes *Romance* a supreme example of meticulous craftsmanship. The expression of restlessness and would-be adultery exists in every action, but it comes to fullest realization when the eight people suddenly throw themselves into a grand-right-and-left. This figure, normally associated with the square dance, rather wryly and absolutely appropriately, becomes the overriding metaphor of the ballet. It allows for every person to be tasted. It creates a world that is wide open and in which relationships are fleeting and fluid and still orderly. Since *Romance* is peopled with couples—who will remain so, despite their yearning, unhappiness, curiosity and adulterous imaginations—the grand-right-and-left is both a wistfully symbolic exercise of their collective wish as well as a wickedly delightful capsule of the events of the ballet. And, of course, the fact that the couples go so far and no further in their adulterous experimentation lends *Romance* a bittersweet, mature and utterly romantic flavor.

Just as Feld has taken *Lilac Garden*'s center and in his own work further peeled it to a grand-right-and-left, so has he chiseled away at the choreographic vocabulary. *Romance* is more in the style of ballroom than ballet. The steps are small and similar. Instead of opening up ballroom style to balletic invention, he squeezes variety out of running steps, turns, and other ballroom devices. In keeping with this rather ascetic approach, the women wear slippers, not toe shoes. Only toward the end of the ballet are the women lifted high into the air or do they raise their legs higher than their waists. Perhaps Feld was overzealously limiting the language, yet the choreographic restriction that he intentionally and daringly imposed on himself yields its own piercingly hot light. The absence of free, dynamic and theatrical individual movement forces one's attention on the dancers' positional arrangements and creates its own impact, because what could have easily been included was defiantly and consistently left out. □

MUSIC

DAVID HAMILTON

After three weeks of concerts by Pierre Boulez with the New York Philharmonic, the temptation is strong to say that the Philharmonic has not only a new music director but also a new orchestra. Disregarding for a moment matters of programming and interpretation, it is undeniable that the orchestra's tonal quality has changed remarkably for Boulez: a lighter, thinner, decidedly more brilliant sound—and, at its best, a level of accurate, virtuosic playing that New York has experienced from its orchestra in residence only rarely in recent years. A comparison with the concerts of the week before Boulez's arrival undoubtedly is unfair, for Skrowaczewski elicited exceptionally coarse playing—but a blind man could hardly have known it was the same ensemble.

While this new quality was almost universally applauded, other characteristics of the Boulez regime are likely to be more controversial. That his sympathies lie unmistakably with the 20th century was known long ago, and it must be assumed that the management has undertaken the project of modernizing both itself and its audiences with its eyes open. Some doubt remains as to whether the audience comes to concerts with ears open (the parade up the aisles during the performance of Berg's *Seven Early Songs* —a work hardly more "radical" than the later music of Wagner—was evidently a

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reaction to the name on the program rather than to the actual music). But for those who would, in general, rather hear something new than something old, something they don't know well than something they know by heart, these programs —and those announced for next season— are the best any established orchestra has offered New York in many years.

An expectable characteristic of Boulez's program making, especially necessary in view of his intention to provide a higher concentration of unfamiliar music, is the balancing of works that involve only parts of the orchestra—thus, he has performed Varèse's *Ionisation* (percussion only), Messiaen's *Oiseaux exotiques* (no strings), Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* (strings only); in such instances the available rehearsal time can be stretched. A similar tactic has been evident on the programs of other orchestras this season, and should be welcomed, not only for its promise of better performances but also for the more varied repertory it opens up.

As in his previous engagement with the Philharmonic, Boulez has evidently concentrated on specific works in each program; until a backlog of "new" repertory is available, some parts of his concerts may apparently be expected to sound rougher than others. In the Stravinsky memorial program (April 29), *Pulcinella* seemed to be scanted. Despite excellent vocal soloists, the orchestral execution was less than impeccable, and conspicuously marred by the inadequacies of a major instrumental soloist. But the *Requiem Canticles* (not the first "major" New York performance, as erroneously reported by one of my colleagues—although certainly the first adequate one) made a considerable impression in this cool, clear reading, and the 1911 *Petrouchka* showed the "new" Philharmonic at close to its best.

Only with more experience of Boulez's performances could one come to fair generalizations, but an initial impression is definitely of a commitment to precision and accuracy. It is an ideal of music making that has, perhaps, more to do with tonal quality than with the shaping of music in time, an emphasis that certainly pays dividends in some repertory and constitutes a welcome counterbalance to the nondescript ensemble heard in Philharmonic Hall on many recent occasions. This kind of discipline is bound to affect the orchestra's work with other conductors as well (Boulez himself will be in residence next season for only eight weeks). On the basis of the announced schedule for 1971-72, which includes cycles of Berg and Liszt as well as some major 20th-century works, I should say that a subscription to the Philharmonic might well be an intellectually stimulating experience for a change, instead of the usual pig in a poke.

During his second week, Boulez also appeared as conductor of the Juilliard Ensemble, conducting his own *Marteau sans maître*, two short Stravinsky works, and the Schoenberg Suite, Op. 29. The last of these was heard a season ago at an ISCM concert conducted by Jacques Monod, a performance that set standards of ensemble and intelligibility for such repertory that have rarely been matched; the inadequately rehearsed Juilliard Ensemble did not come close to that standard, and the resulting scramble could not be accurately described as a performance. The remainder was more satisfactory, and graced by the presence of Jan DeGaetani, whose ear seems to gain subtlety all the time.

On April 27, the Chicago Symphony returned to New York, to add a footnote to the opera season in the form of a concert performance of Wagner's *Das Rheingold* that was without question the most remarkable "traditional" operatic manifestation of the year. Georg Solti has vastly increased his command of the Wagnerian " long line" since he recorded this opera more than a decade ago, and no work in the *Ring* needs it more. Wagner's great innovation here was the enormous expansion of time scale; what he had not yet solved was how to fill it all with music (cutting the weaker passages doesn't improve matters, for it merely distorts the time scale)—and Solti provided the necessary momentum and firmness to carry the opera through, without his earlier tendency to be overemphatic of detail. An indication of the directorial and orchestral mastery at work is that, when asked later about the balance between orchestra and voices (usually a difficult matter when the orchestra is on stage rather than in a pit), I realized that the problem had not ever raised its head. The singers were, by and large, more than adequate. Mr. Solti promises to bring us Schoenberg's *Moses und Aron* next season. □

OUTPOST

Innocent wind
lifting the manes of the horses,
the mare holding stiff,
a portent.

Body stiff in fear, as in love.

Downhill, children laughing,

loving
earth, that feeds us and swallows us.

Marilyn Thompson

PERSONALS

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1394

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 Club for Hibernians? (10)
6 Tip, as they used to during the tournament. (4)
10 Might it give the balance of the story? (7)
11 Messes up what sounds like a character associated with 6 and 26. (7)
12 People who kick about the Southern capital are probably funny. (8)
13 Woman's place in certain Oriental countries? (5)
15 Birds share, awkwardly enough. (5)
17 What Remarque took to be other than main streets? (9)
19 You might find tramping a change, but still grouse! (9)
21 This bird is certainly not up to par. (5)
23 Stress, in strict usage. (5)
24 and 29 Color possibly obtained from an electric needle? (8,4)
27 Gone berserk, but possibly dug out of the inside of a fish. (7)
28 Gridiron return? (7)
29 See 24 across.
30 Change for a dime,.back on board, but regional in the States. (10)

DOWN

1 and 25 down A pair of horses, such as George or Edward, sometimes given open-handedly to children. (9)
2 Embrace. (7)
3 They might not appreciate finer things, such as a lotus arrangement. (5)
4 Shaken with guilt, Bert might not be popular with conservationists. (6,3)
5 Inserts, perhaps, what the horn does if too close. (5)
7 *Twelfth Night* country. (7)
8 Matters somehow, when about to pose a question for the teacher. (10)
9 Possibly used with early oil holdings. (8)
14 Strangely enough. at first it means cutting close, though altogether appearing unexpectedly. (8,2)
16 Seems perhaps three-quarters of the term, as a major division of the annual session. (8)
18 Choosy students might before signing up as an assemblage. (9)
20 Bill might be kept playing a part. (5,2)
22 Weapon covering most of Prince Charles' domain at the vessel's edge. (7)
24 Such a peninsula is in a muddle. (5)
25 See 1 down.
26 Pelt with fruit outside? (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1393

ACROSS: 1 Fit for a king; 9 and 10 Withstand; 11 and 24 Iron curtain; 12 Burglar; 13 Dashing; 15 Grenades; 16 and 14 Stands aside; 18 Decamp; 21 Diatribe; 26 Camorra; 28 and 30 Planking; 31 Consolidate. DOWN: 2 Iphigenia; 3 and 29 Fish and chips; 4 Rear; 5 Kidnaps; 6 and 23 Neighboring; 7 Liquor; 8 Conned; 17 Air pocket; 19 Equals; 20 Princess; 22 Amassed; 25 Tango; 27 Till.

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